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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24
was established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the
negotiating strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the
international financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country
grouping within the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing
countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
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Abstract
The Aid for Trade initiative was revolutionary in the acceptance by international consensus of a
role for the World Trade Organization (WTO) in aid and of the limitations of trade. The general
case for aid for trade is that while trade can be a tool for development, countries need
infrastructure, institutions, technical capacity, investment, etc., in order to trade, and in particular
to respond to new liberalization under the WTO. The case for WTO-related Aid for Trade (AfT)
is that although many in developing countries will gain from a WTO settlement, there are costs
to some developing countries and some have little to gain from multilateral trade liberalization.
The first responses proposed to the WTO dilemma were trade measures, more or better preferences.
But this would not work for countries with exports that are either highly dependent on preferences
or whose other exports are already relatively free from barriers. And preferences were increasingly
being challenged by the non-preferred countries and by those who feared that they obstruct
multilateral liberalization.
Aid for Trade emerged as an issue within the Doha Round, first driven by the need to find
benefits for all countries in the negotiation, and thus “as a complement, not a substitute” for
the Round. By the time the Round stalled, it had acquired sufficient support from the aid
community as well as the trade community to go forward independently of the Round. When it
was part of the negotiations, there was pressure to define a new structure for trade aid, outside
normal aid mechanisms and parallel to those for other international concerns such as health or
the environment. Without the need to secure developing countries’ support for a trade settlement,
however, there is now a risk that it will be absorbed into normal country aid programmes, and
be governed by the wishes of the international financial institutions
There may be an increase in aid for improving the trading and productive capacities of developing
countries. But there will be no way to ensure that the direction of that aid will be determined by
the priorities of the international trading system. The WTO and its members retain the potential
to influence the allocation of funds through monitoring, analysis, and debate. But the leadership
has now shifted to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. To ensure that the
implementation of Aid for Trade reflects the decisions that they have made in the WTO, therefore
countries must act there to require that these institutions now act coherently to accept a priority
for trade that has been determined by another international institution, the WTO. This may
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The Mandate for Aid for Trade derives from
the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on Aid
for Trade, paragraph 57 (WTO, 2005a):
We welcome the discussions of Finance and
Development Ministers in various fora, includ-
ing the Development Committee of the World
Bank and IMF, that have taken place this year
on expanding Aid for Trade. Aid for Trade
should aim to help developing countries, par-
ticularly LDCs, to build the supply-side ca-
pacity and trade-related infrastructure that they
need to assist them to implement and benefit
from WTO Agreements and more broadly to
expand their trade. Aid for Trade cannot be a
substitute for the development benefits that
will result from a successful conclusion to the
DDA, particularly on market access. However,
it can be a valuable complement to the DDA.
We invite the Director-General to create a task
force that shall provide recommendations on
how to operationalize Aid for Trade. The Task
Force will provide recommendations to the
General Council by July 2006 on how Aid for
Trade might contribute most effectively to the
development dimension of the DDA. We also
invite the Director-General to consult with
Members as well as with the IMF and World
Bank, relevant international organizations and
the regional development banks with a view
to reporting to the General Council on appro-
priate mechanisms to secure additional finan-
cial resources for Aid for Trade, where appro-
priate through grants and concessional loans.
This was revolutionary in the acceptance by a
consensus including all developed and most devel-
oping countries of any role for the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in aid and of the limitations of
trade measures alone. It rejects exaggerated claims
that trade can only have benefits.
At its September 2006 meeting, the Group of
Twenty-Four welcomed “recent proposals regarding
the ‘aid for trade’ agenda” (Group of Twenty-Four,
2006). This paper will discuss how the initiative
arose, in the two contexts of development policy and
international negotiations, explore the decisions that
now need to be taken, and ask if it will mark a sig-
nificant change in the aid or trade regimes.
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There have been two strands of discussion of
Aid for Trade (AfT), helping countries to increase
their productive and trading capacity and helping
countries meet the costs of WTO-related changes.
The arguments for them are different; the costs are
very different in magnitude; and one is much more
closely related to the WTO.
The arguments for the first type of AfT are that
countries need infrastructure, institutions, technical
capacity, investment, etc., in order to trade, in gen-
eral and in the specific case of new liberalization
under the WTO. In the past, which countries should
be eligible and for how much have been settled by
aid, not trade, criteria. What is new and controver-
sial is how far the WTO should have a role in this
type of aid. One role which it has already had is in
shifting aid agencies’ attention back to trade.
The case for WTO-related AfT is that there are
additional costs from a WTO settlement (implemen-
tation, preference erosion, food prices …). Many
countries provide adjustment assistance internally;
transferring money to countries which lose is in prin-
ciple the same, especially if it is a transfer from
the “rich” to the “poor”. Alternatively, there is the
external economy argument, for example, for re-
gional aid, building a road across a coastal country
for the benefit of a landlocked country; spending
money in a preference-losing country to permit greater
trade liberalization may benefit a non-preferred
country.
The potential for aid and trade to work together
to help developing countries might seem obvious,
but there has been a history of mistrust and apparent
conflict between them (Page, 2006). Aid agencies
in developed countries and finance ministries in de-
veloping are normally entirely separate from trade
ministries, so that there is rarely an institutional spur
to consider the possibility of using trade measures.
On the trade side, although there has been much study
of how trade can contribute to development, this has
come mainly from the schools of economics that
mistrust government planning and intervention.
These economists have not had an interest in look-
ing at how aid decisions are made and how aid is
allocated. The new interest on both sides, therefore,
seems to offer the potential for increasing the effec-
tiveness of both trade and aid policy through greater
coordination, although the discussion of AfT has
shown that the division remains wide.
2. The analytic rationale behind
proposals for using aid to support
trade
2.1 Trade is an important activity in
developing countries
Developing countries have particular difficul-
ties in trading. Exporters face all the difficulties
inherent to a developing country, of poor infrastruc-
ture, thin product chains, lack of familiarity with
standards or ability to meet them, and weak public
and private institutions, but, unlike suppliers to the
home market, they must compete with exporters in
developed countries without these disadvantages.
They are more likely to need to change to new prod-
ucts and markets (this is the essence of development).
They need to increase their exports exceptionally
rapidly in order to be able to import the physical
and technological inputs they need to develop.
2.2 Trade is essential to development
Trade was first considered a central element in
countries’ development strategies in the 1950s and
1960s. It owed its new significance partly to the ex-
perience of the developed countries in the 1930s,
when restrictions on trade had had serious effects
on many, partly to the experience of countries which
had seen their economies transformed during World
War II by changes in trade patterns, and partly to
new ways of analysing the choices facing develop-
ing countries. In the 1950s and early 1960s, there
were no examples of countries that were still clearly
“developing”, but competing against “industrial
countries” through producing competitive exports
in some industries. Therefore, it seemed that the only
strategy open to them was to continue to specialise
in primary products for export, but concentrate on
increasing production of other goods for home con-
sumption. In terms of trade policy, this meant a
concentration on policies to control imports.
Then came the first generation of successful
Asian economies. They showed that it was not nec-
essary for a country to develop an integrated national
industry before competing with developing coun-
tries in manufactures. They showed that developing
countries could export manufactures, and that this3 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
was closely associated with very rapid growth and
structural change. So the obvious, if not the logical,
conclusion was that exports led to development.
There remained disagreement about whether an ini-
tial period of import substitution was necessary as a
preparation, but agreement that export opportunities
are sooner or later essential. The important change
in what could be identified as conventional views
was from emphasis on the efficiency role of trade to
a view that there were dynamic effects.
Conventional theory. In traditional terms, open-
ing trade should raise a country’s income (welfare)
by permitting it to change the composition of its
output to a more efficient structure, that is, permit-
ting it to specialize according to comparative
advantage. Even if the principal effect of trade is
merely the comparative static one, to increase in-
come and average productivity through reallocation
of resources, this could lead to prolonged growth as
a result of a sequence of one-off changes because of
the great number of new possible markets and types
of production, and in some countries, of high barri-
ers and substantial potential for structural change.
This could be sufficient to justify concluding that
helping developing countries to trade more effec-
tively would be a useful tool for development.
There is also a straightforward demand argu-
ment. If there is unemployed capacity, but there are
administrative reasons or foreign exchange con-
straints that mean that there are no ways of increasing
domestic sources of demand, then raising exports
will be the only way to stimulate growth.
Export-led growth. But much of the literature
on the role of the external sector moved beyond these
efficiency effects (e.g. Krueger, 1983). The appar-
ent association between high and rapidly growing
exports and rapid growth of manufacturing and of
total output suggested that a policy of opening an
economy to external influences (liberalization) or
perhaps even a policy of deliberately biasing growth
towards exports (export promotion) could improve
investment and growth, and raise efficiency not only
from reallocation of resources and increases in ag-
gregate demand, but by increasing the dynamic
efficiency of the economy. The strong argument is
that exposure to competition, from imports and in
export markets, increases the efficiency of firms, not
simply by providing information or access to tech-
nology (these can be done without trade), but because
the threat of losing markets (and profits) is more of
an incentive to change than the potential to increase
them. This represents a particular view about the
nature of incentives (that sticks are more effective
than carrots) which is not adopted in other economic
theory. It was this type of analysis, often associated
with the World Bank (see section 3.1) which strongly
influenced the view that increasing the opportuni-
ties for developing countries to export (through the
Doha Round) could have a significant effect on their
development. But, unlike the other reasons for expect-
ing exports to help growth, this theory is not entirely
consistent with a view that offering increased inter-
national demand (a carrot) will promote development.
Even if we accept that there is substantial evi-
dence of an association between successful exporters
and successful development, the implications of such
arguments for aid are not clear. The very market-
orientated arguments for how trade works do not
suggest a direct role for aid, but they may reinforce
the traditional argument for aid to create the condi-
tions to trade. Such aid could make a country better
able to respond to opportunities.
As well as supporting aid to help trade, the ar-
guments for trade’s role in development have in the
past been used to justify direct intervention in trade
to help developing countries.
Special and differential trade policies. The ear-
liest measures encouraged an import substitution
strategy, while the offer of special access provided
some encouragement to exports. From 1947, Arti-
cle XVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) allowed developing members to pro-
tect imports and use domestic policy to develop
particular sectors. Countries could also continue to
offer special access to colonies or other associated
countries. The provisions were reinforced and con-
solidated by the adoption of Part IV in 1966 (GATT,
1994).
The export side was strengthened from the
1970s, as exports became more central to thinking
on development. In 1971 GATT authorised prefer-
ences as an exception to MFN treatment through a
waiver. The access arrangements were implemented
by individual developed countries, not by any gen-
eral reduction in the tariffs notified to the WTO. In
1979, following the Tokyo Round, the Enabling
Clause (GATT, 1979) was adopted to allow not only4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
preferences for developing countries, including fur-
ther flexibility in the application of rules, but
additional special treatment for Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) (the first differentiation among
developing countries), and this remains the basic
WTO statement of principles for SDT.
The Uruguay Round (UR), in contrast, at-
tempted to move toward ending all permanent
differentiation: agriculture and textiles were brought
under normal rules; all countries had to sign all agree-
ments; as in the Kennedy Round, there were formula
tariff reductions, a de facto shift away from the dif-
ferentiation allowed by sectoral negotiations. The
differentiation still allowed in agriculture, through a
combination of average and minimum cuts, applied
to all Members. The remaining differences allowed
for developing countries were partial or delayed
compliance. The “declaration” on food importing
countries did imply structural differentiation, but it
was not accompanied by any provision for imple-
mentation. The Uruguay Round did not, however,
formally change GATT Part IV or the Enabling
Clause; these continue to allow (and advocate) spe-
cial treatment, and were reinforced by the Decision
of December 1993 in favour of LDCs, which en-
couraged more rapid implementation of tariff cuts
on products of interest to LDCs.
Do preferences help? The vast literature on this
can be summarised as “sometimes”. Some countries
that have had preferences increased trade particu-
larly rapidly and especially in the preferred sectors.
Some countries have used preferences and the asso-
ciated economic rents from one product to develop
through diversification into another. Such countries,
and some analysts, attribute their success to the pref-
erences. Some countries with preferences have failed
to benefit because they were not in the right com-
modities (they faced protection for agriculture and
clothing) or because they received preferences at the
wrong time (countries with severe structural prob-
lems and supply constraints cannot use additional
access). Preferences always offer countries’ princi-
pal objective in traditional trade negotiation terms:
access to markets on more favourable terms than
other suppliers.
There are systemic arguments against them.
Countries with preferences may attempt to preserve
these by obstructing liberalization. For most coun-
tries, dependent on preferences for some exports,
but on the general trade regime for others, this is
unlikely to happen. But a few are so dependent on
preferences that they do have an interest in preserv-
ing the current system.
There are reasons why preferences may be of
more limited usefulness than in the past, especially
for the Least Developed Countries which are now
the ones at which preferences are being most tar-
geted. The more multilateral barriers are reduced,
the less valuable are preferences. Rules of origin
which require a high level of vertical integration of
industry always create obstacles for small countries
with limited industrial capacity, and rules in prefer-
ence regimes are becoming more restrictive. Most
current exports by LDCs to developed countries are
primary commodities which would enter duty free
or at low tariffs even if they were on Most-Favoured
Nation (MFN) terms. Supply factors are an increas-
ingly well-recognized barrier to using preferences,
even in non-LDC countries. And LDCs are precisely
the countries where the supply constraints on using
preferences may be most serious.
Preferences affect other developing countries,
which do not receive the same preferences. In many
cases, developed countries have transferred the “cost”
(in protectionist terms) of liberalizing their trade with
the favoured developing countries to the less favoured
by choosing those imports which compete with other
developing countries, rather than those that compete
with developed countries’ own production.
The benefits of preferences mean that countries
will only accept change if they receive something in
exchange. But the disadvantages, especially the risks
to the system, suggest that the WTO needs to find
alternative ways of helping developing countries to
export, if trade is indeed a significant factor in de-
velopment.
2.3 Trade and poverty
That trade reduces poverty was a popular theme
during the 1990s emphasis on poverty reduction as
the most important goal for development assistance,
but the direct links are less important than the tradi-
tional path from trade through development to
poverty. Trade theory argues that increasing the
openness of an economy (if it is done in a non-
distorted way) improves the return to those factors
of production which are less scarce in the country5 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
than in the world as a whole (their prices relative to
other factors move closer to the ratios found in the
rest of the world). For countries with scarce capital
and abundant labour, the conventional model of a
developing country, this is likely to mean an im-
provement in income distribution towards wages and
towards the poor.
But this simple relation need not lead to the
conclusion that trade is the best tool for reducing
poverty (Bird, 2004; Conway, 2004). First, the eco-
nomic relationship will have a different result in
countries where natural resources, whether agricul-
tural, mineral or (for tourism) scenic are the principal
advantage. There, trade may shift the distribution
towards returns to holders of resources, and thus to
profits and rents. Even if there is an increase in the
share of labour income, this may not have a direct
effect on the least skilled and poorest. If trade re-
duces the cost of imports, some consumers will gain,
and some of these may be poor, but the size of the
effect cannot be easily related to the change in trade.
Growth in incomes definitely increases the poten-
tial to reduce poverty; it does not itself reduce
poverty. Increased national income permits increased
social spending, although if the increase in trade
comes in part from lower taxes on trade, this can
only be realised if the government successfully finds
alternative sources of income.
There are also potential negative effects directly
from trade to poverty, so the final effect depends on
policy choices. The poverty literature views both
shocks and structural changes less favourably than
the growth literature, often appearing to put a higher
weight on losses than on gains in analysing the net
effects of a policy. It also puts more weight on the
short-term effects and on direct effects. This sub-
stantially reduces the expected benefits from trade.
The poverty argument for trade must therefore be
mainly based on the development one that trade in-
creases income. Complementary policies to do with
aspects other than trade (e.g. transport infrastruc-
ture, education or safety nets) may be critical in
maximising the benefits and minimising the losses
that the poor experience from trade liberalization.
As long as the poverty and Millennium Devel-
opment Goal (MDG) focus continues, advocates of
the potential benefits of coherence between aid and
trade policy must accept that some will argue that it
is trade policy which should be subordinated to aid
policy and its poverty reducing objectives. Those
who argue that aid should be designed to assist trade
objectives need to face this. To the extent that trade
itself contributes to development, the link from de-
velopment to poverty is an argument. But trade is
not the only way to promote development so in aid
terms a policy of deliberately targeting aid at a trade
need could not be justified without weighing the
importance of trade against the other priorities of
the country (or the donors). There are possible rea-
sons to justify this, outside aid priorities, as is
discussed below in considering the aspects of trade
which can be considered public goods.
The same type of argument holds in reverse.
Any deliberate targeting of gains from trade at aid
objectives must be judged against all the objectives
of trade. The international trade regime is intended
to increase world income and to promote sustain-
able development, but it is also intended to give to
both developing and developed countries the ben-
efits of a consistent and predictable environment in
which to trade and make investment plans.
There are choices of priorities to be made, and
the questions are what should guide these choices,
and who should make them.
2.4 Future trends mean countries will need
more aid in order to trade
An argument against applying past evidence on
the benefits of trade to countries which are now start-
ing their development is that they are different in
their potential for trade: a much higher proportion
of those which remain poor are land-locked, and
therefore facing much higher costs of trading. They
have mainly similarly poor neighbours, and thus lack
easy markets. They are small, with low-skilled la-
bour, so lack both natural resources and labour as an
advantage in entering developed country markets.
High costs and low returns might suggest that such
countries would be expected to trade less, for a given
resource endowment or level of development, than
the countries observed in the past. But they may also
be less suited to the alternative, import substituting,
mode of development, because their small size lim-
its the size of the market. Aid, rather than trade, might
help them to find new development strategies.
In the last forty years, developing countries
have greatly increased their shares of world output6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
and of world trade. From about 20 per cent in the
1970s, their share in trade rose to 25 per cent in the
early 1980s. After a slow rise in the 1990s (with the
decline in commodity prices), it reached a third by
2005. But the actual change in the structure of the
world economy was even greater, because these data
include at each point in time only those countries
which were then defined as “developing”. Some, for
example Spain and Portugal, became “developed”
during the period, so that the performance of the re-
maining developing countries is even more impressive.
As a result, most countries, developed as well as
developing, now have a high share of their trade with
countries which are currently “developing coun-
tries”.
The World Bank has recently published (World
Bank, 2006) its projections for the next twenty-five
years. In its interpretation of them, it asserts that
“Developing countries, once considered the periph-
ery of the global economy, will become main
drivers.” It claims that their share of trade will rise
to almost 45 per cent (World Bank, 2006: x), while
their share of global output will rise to a third. But
this interpretation relies on defining “developing
countries in 2030” as those countries which were
“developing” in 2006. This is misleading. As the
Bank report notes, by 2030 incomes in what it calls
the developing countries will average (using con-
stant prices) $11,000, “roughly the level of the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic today”, while
“countries as diverse as China, Mexico, and Turkey
would have average living standards roughly com-
parable to Spain today” (World Bank, 2006: x). But
countries which are at or above that level in 2030
will, like “Spain today”, not be developing coun-
tries, either in the economic sense in which we use
the words today or in their own perceptions. As the
report notes elsewhere, what we are seeing is a shift
to a world dominated by a “global middle class”. It
is therefore possible to take a diametrically opposite
interpretation, that we are moving from a world
where developing countries (in the normal sense of
the word) are a significant force to one where most
of the larger countries (led by China) will have
moved above the line. There will remain a small and
declining share of increasingly marginalised coun-
tries. They will be mainly in Africa.
In the last twenty years, while developing coun-
tries as a group increased their share of world trade,
this was based principally on rises for Asia, but also
included Latin America. These more than offset falls
for Africa and the Middle East. In the 1980s, the
share of Africa and of low income countries in world
trade declined. By 1998, the share of Africa in world
exports was 2 per cent, having fallen from 2.7 per
cent in the late 1980s and 4.4 per cent in 1983. In
the next twenty-five years, the pattern will continue,
as East Asian average incomes as a share of high in-
come countries’ average income double to 35 per cent.
Latin American incomes still hover around 27–28 per
cent, but African income is expected to fall slightly
from its current 5 per cent. “Africa, now home to
one-third of the poorest people, is likely to see its
share of the lowest tenth double by 2030” (World
Bank, 2006: xiii).
The international trading system will need to
adjust to a world in which trade is once again mainly
among developed countries (now including China),
while most African and a few other countries see
both their income and their importance in the inter-
national economy fall further behind. There are clear
risks to those left behind: their power to demand
assistance, whether financial or in favourable poli-
cies, will be eroded. There are also political risks to
a world economy with such marginalized members,
as there are in nation states which have a class of the
permanently poor. And there are implications for
trade institutions. In these, as in markets, develop-
ing countries have become strong, and therefore have
been able to promote their interests increasingly ef-
fectively in recent years. The changes in preferences
and regions are in part the result of this change in
power. The nature of decision making in the WTO
has adapted to the presence of a large number of
developing countries with a stake in the system and
participating actively. A change back in the balance
may provide comfort for the developed countries,
although this, of course, will be a different group
with new members. But there is an increased risk
that some will be left behind.
2.5 Aid is needed to ensure that all groups
and all countries gain from trade
The arguments that are used for aid for trade
are all based on a view that trade is basically benefi-
cial to developing countries. But some accept, to
varying degrees, that it may have costs, to some
groups or to some countries, temporary or perma-
nent. The benefits will outweigh these costs (for
example, the costs to those within a country who7 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
may lose because of new competition from imports
will be less than the gains to others from increased
income or the costs to some countries of preference
erosion will be less than the gains from liberaliza-
tion for the non-preferred). But aid to the losers,
particularly if it is used to help them adapt to be able
to benefit from trade, is desirable to ensure that there
are not serious costs to poor people or poor coun-
tries in promoting a generally beneficial policy. A
more general argument is that aid may be needed to
help countries to have the potential to benefit from
trade, to improve their ability to supply goods or
services that match the opportunities to trade.
2.6 Practical arguments in
the current context
To these developmental arguments were added
two practical ones. There have been large recent
increases in aid, and promises of much greater in-
creases. Spending more on existing programmes may
be difficult, and there is the financial problem that
large inflows of foreign currency drive up the ex-
change rate (new aid is like a commodity price
boom). Programmes offering specific stimulus to
trade help to solve these aid problems. And second,
as long as there seemed a chance that the Doha Round
would succeed, it was necessary to find something
to offer those countries who feared that they would
lose from proposed liberalization.
2.7 What is not in the rationale
for Aid for Trade
There is no place in the standard Aid for Trade
literature or in the current implementation of the
WTO proposals for arguing that aid is needed be-
cause trade liberalization is happening outside
developing countries’ control and is imposing (net)
costs on them, i.e. that trade is to be considered a
cost to avoid. Such a belief would, obviously, not be
consistent with offering aid to help countries trade
more effectively, and is not consistent with the na-
tional policies of most developing countries now, as
they have lowered their tariffs and barriers to services
trade much more than required by WTO agreements.
Developing countries still have substantial “space”
within WTO rules to use trade or domestic policy for
development (Page, 2007). Other types of agreement,
notably bilateral or regional arrangements, have im-
posed more constraints on countries, but aid for trade
in the multilateral context is not designed to meet
problems caused by other agreements.
3. Evolution of support for Aid for
Trade in the WTO negotiations
3.1 Background to the presence of aid
as an issue in the Doha Round
Problems from the Uruguay Round. Most
analyses of “the results of the Uruguay Round” had
ignored the existence of preferences in calculating
the potential export gains for developing countries
(e.g. during the Round: GATT, 1993; after it: Martin
and Winters, 1996), and the most commonly used
general equilibrium model for calculating the effects
of changes in trade policy did not include these until
2003. Some unofficial analyses of the Uruguay Round
(Page and Davenport, 1994) had found negative effects
for Least Developed and other preference-receiving
countries, in both agriculture and textiles and cloth-
ing. In the late 1990s the very limited results of the
Uruguay Round became recognized. Countries
feared that the gains in the Doha Round might also
be small. Countries like Bangladesh, Mauritius, and
Sri Lanka were beginning to express concern that
the end of controls on textiles and clothing exports
by developing countries (at the end of 2004) would
damage them because they had replaced some of the
quota-constrained countries. As the Doha Round
began, there was little expectation that these coun-
tries would have major gains on services, and areas
like trade facilitation and public health were likely
to offer small effects.
There was another “hangover” from the Uru-
guay Round. The extension of international rules to
new areas like intellectual property and the tighten-
ing of rules on areas like customs administration led
to complaints that these had high costs of compli-
ance for developing countries, and therefore that they
needed assistance in order to avoid being disadvan-
taged. Some observers took the position that the new
agreements were of no benefit to developing coun-
tries, and therefore that all costs incurred should be
considered as “excessive”, but even an alternative
position, that the benefits were less for them, would
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cess costs. The two fears, of limited benefits and
potential costs, led many developing countries to
declare that a Round had little to offer them.
Newly powerful developing countries. Prefer-
ences depended on acceptance that trade rules could
be informal and that developed countries could de-
cide whom to prefer. It was accepted that developed
countries would offer better treatment to traditional
trading partners or those that they wanted to assist.
The lack of constraints on interventions in agriculture
until the Uruguay Round had allowed arrangements
like the sugar and banana regimes which gave pre-
ferred access and favourable prices to particular
classes of countries for specific commodities. And
even if any of these “special and differential” treat-
ments had been considered contrary to GATT rules,
the GATT dispute mechanism had no teeth: disputes
could be dragged out and all countries (including
the loser in a dispute) had to approve any action to
implement a decision. The increasing power and skill
of developing countries in trade negotiations has
meant that this type of policy is no longer accept-
able. The extension of preferences to more (in some
cases all) products from Least Developed Countries
helped to focus attention on the losses to countries
which are not LDCs, while the increasing effective-
ness of the WTO dispute mechanism has offered
non-preferred countries ways of challenging prefer-
ences. It became clear that any trade concessions
would have to be limited to the permitted catego-
ries: tariff reductions for recognized groups of
countries (for developing or for LDCs). This is not a
sufficiently flexible tool for aid.
The move from poverty. A final change that
would contribute to acceptance of directing aid to-
wards trade was the change starting in about 2005
away from the 1990s emphasis on poverty as the
most important target of aid. The emphasis of the
Millennium Development Goals, the official United
Nations targets for aid, had been on social spending.
In analytic terms, the focus had been on results (at-
taining the targets) not on means (what can promote
sustainable development). There is now a return to
looking at the means.
In place of preferences. As giving developing
countries extra opportunities to trade has helped
some of them to develop, it is not possible for the
WTO (especially if it accepts a development obli-
gation) simply to reject preferences as no longer
useful and unfair without offering an alternative. The
obvious one is to provide finance to help countries
to achieve the necessary developmental pre-condi-
tions for trading. Finance also is an alternative to
exports in directly alleviating the external constraint
on development. Helping developing countries
through aid rather than other trade concessions was
a major new initiative for the WTO, and one that
could seem inconsistent both with its role as a trade
agency and with other funding by developed countries,
through their aid programmes and the international
financial institutions. As the Doha Round evolved,
however, AfT was suggested because the other pro-
posals for dealing with the problem seemed more
unsatisfactory and more difficult. Suggesting that
countries find other ways to increase their exports,
perhaps through alternative preferences, would not
work for countries with exports that are either highly
dependent on preferences or whose other exports are
relatively free from barriers, and would perpetuate
the problems for the system and for countries out-
side preference schemes.
3.2 How Aid for Trade emerged
in the Doha Round
Recognizing the problem. There was no men-
tion of Aid for Trade in the Doha Declaration. Like
many settlements coming out of the Uruguay Round,
it mentioned the need for technical assistance for
countries to comply with new rules, and stated that
“technical cooperation and capacity building are core
elements of the development dimension of the mul-
tilateral trading system” (WTO, 2001), but only com-
mitted to maintaining the existing value of WTO
technical assistance, along with supporting coordi-
nation with other donors. There was no suggestion
that this should be a negotiating condition of the
Round. The commitments to Least Developed in the
Doha Declaration concentrate on market access
(paragraph 42) and technical assistance, and there
was no recognition of the problems that market ac-
cess for others could cause.
It did not envisage any losses from trade liber-
alization, so did not consider whether such losses
might need compensation Indeed, the concept of a
“development round” was based on the explicit be-
lief by many commentators that liberalizing trade
would provide significant benefits for all develop-
ing countries and an assumption that it could not be
harmful.9 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
This was perhaps the final appearance of the
view that trade was the most important input into
development so countries needed “trade not aid”.
This slogan was based not only on attributing the
success of the East Asian countries entirely to trade,
but also on an assumption that aid could not be in-
creased and a comparison of the magnitudes of trade
and aid flows. Aid flows had been falling in the
1990s, and were expected to continue to do so,
whether from aid fatigue or for more specific rea-
sons such as the end of the Cold War. Therefore trade
was the only tool available for helping developing
countries. Aid flows, however, are now rising.
It is important to note that from the point of
view of a developing country the comparison of ben-
efits should not be between the value of an increase
in aid and the value of the alternative trade flow be-
cause aid is a straight transfer of resources while
exports by the developing country use both national
and imported inputs, and unless all these were un-
employed and unemployable there is a cost. This
reduces the net value to national income of exports
to a (possibly small) fraction of the traded value.
Even if the net value of trade is correctly calcu-
lated, there are fundamental distributional differences.
The developing countries which can increase their
exports, and in particular those which are so com-
petitive that they face barriers in the developed
countries, are in general not the ones most depend-
ent on aid. In developed countries, the distributional
consequences might be better from a welfare point
of view (ending protection hurts profits in dying in-
dustries, although it may also hurt labour; reducing
aid spending would permit either higher domestic
spending by the government or lower taxes, which
might benefit all the population).
In developing countries, aid and trade encour-
age the growth of different sectors. Aid could be used
to support the activities that are normally in the pri-
vate sector, to establish market-oriented industries
or services, directly or through subsidies, but this is
now rare. It is likely to fund general government
activities, health and education spending, transpor-
tation and communications infrastructure, sometimes
energy or water infrastructure. It may provide so-
cial services, research or housing. In contrast, trade
increases the demand for the production of goods
and services normally found in the private sector.
As countries began to analyse their prospects
in the Round and prepare their positions, it became
clear that the optimistic view that a successful liber-
alizing round would have major positive develop-
ment effects was over-optimistic, and some began
to fear that the effects might be negative. In July 2002
(WTO, 2002: 2), the LDCs suggested that:
... supply side constraints in developing coun-
tries and their need to retain the flexibility of
being able to adopt pro-development policies
and options should be addressed. This can be
done in several ways, including: (i) exemp-
tions from obligations for developing, particu-
larly least-developed countries, if those obli-
gations would constrain or prevent develop-
ing countries from adopting policies or meas-
ures required for their economic and social de-
velopment, and (ii) obligations on the part of
developed countries to assist developing coun-
tries to build their supply-side capacity to fos-
ter national production capacity as well as
export supply capacity.
And there was a need (WTO, 2002: 3) to “Pro-
vide temporary financial compensation for fall in
export earnings resulting from a reduction of MFN
tariff rates in the case of products whose share in the
total export earnings of an LDC exceeds 50 per cent”,
the first explicit proposals on obligatory aid for costs
and for preference erosion.
Then, in 2003, the IMF (IMF, 2003a) in an of-
ficial submission to the WTO accepted the argument
that preference erosion would have significant costs,
and that:
In any assessment of the balance of payments
need in the context of program discussions,
Fund staff should take into account the poten-
tial losses from preference erosion as one of
the elements that affect the external environ-
ment facing a country’s exports.
It explicitly criticized the methodology of
previous studies, e.g. Ianchovichina et al. (2001),
Hoekman et al. (2001), and even an UNCTAD study
by Bora et al. (2002), which had looked at total LDCs
or total African countries for effects of preference
erosion, and found very small numbers. “The GTAP
general equilibrium model on which these simulations
are based is not able to estimate the impact on indi-
vidual LDCs.” The studies “do not fully take into
account the EBA and AGOA.”
The IMF found (IMF, 2003a: 12) that: “signifi-
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26 out of the 46 LDCs, export losses from prefer-
ence erosion are estimated to be less than two per
cent, and for another 15 countries less than five per
cent. Thus, only five countries may face losses ex-
ceeding five per cent of exports. These are Malawi
(11.5 per cent), Mauritania (8.8 per cent), Haiti
(6.4 per cent), Cape Verde (6.3 per cent) and Sao
Tome and Principe (5.2 per cent). In absolute value,
the largest likely losers are Bangladesh ($222 mil-
lion), Cambodia ($54 million), Malawi ($49 million),
Mauritania ($40.4 million) and Tanzania ($29 mil-
lion).” The IMF paper was the first by an inter-
national institution to do the calculations on a country
basis.
At the same time, a study for the African Un-
ion (ILEAP, 2003) found similar results, using a
slightly different methodology. It had been commis-
sioned to find what benefits African countries could
expect from increased access for agricultural prod-
ucts under the current proposals in the Doha Round,
reflecting the expectations at the time. It first found
that most African agricultural exports did not pay
MFN rates, so that there would be virtually no gains,
and then suggested that preference erosion would
be a major problem, and found that Malawi (at 17 per
cent of exports), followed by Uganda and the United
Republic of Tanzania would be the major losers on
its assumptions about liberalization. It was probably
these two studies (which were communicated to the
African group, and to Malawi in particular, during
the summer of 2003, before the Cancún Ministerial
Conference) which helped to convince a large
number of LDCs and African countries that they had
little to gain and (for some) much to lose in the Doha
negotiations unless they received financial compen-
sation.
The ILEAP study concluded that the main po-
tential gains for African countries could come from
pressing for substantial reduction in subsidies to
agriculture in the developed countries as these were
depressing prices. This had also been noticed by the
cotton producing countries of West Africa. Also in
2003, four West African countries, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali cited the cost to them of subsi-
dies, notably by the United States, and placed this
as a separate item on the agenda for Cancún. Cotton
is between 5 and 10 per cent of their GDP, and more
than 60 per cent of exports (Goreux, 2003). They
requested, in addition to any changes in subsidies in
the Doha context (which could not take effect until
at least 2005) not only an interim reduction in subsi-
dies starting in 2004, but, until 2006, compensation
for Least Developed cotton producers based on the
estimated losses suffered (about $250 million in di-
rect costs and four times that for indirect, WTO,
2003c; 2003b). This would be paid by the countries
subsidising their cotton. The proposal was targeted
principally at the United States, whose subsidies are
quantitatively the most important, although the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and China also have subsidies
which may be damaging to some exporters.
One main group of beneficiaries from prefer-
ences, those who had sugar quotas at two to three
times the market price for their exports to the EU
and the United States, had also recognized the prob-
lem by 2003, with a paper to the WTO from Mauritius
(Mauritius, 2003).
One problem with these calculations, and those
that followed, e.g. by the IMF for the middle in-
come countries (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004), the
WTO (Low et al., 2005; 2006), World Bank (Nielson,
2006), and UNCTAD (2005), is that there is no gen-
erally accepted way of calculating the gains from
preferences (and hence the losses from erosion),
partly because of lack of consensus on the purpose
of preferences. They may provide increased volume
of exports, a production effect accompanied by an
income effect; new opportunities for a particular type
of exports (e.g. new manufactures), an industrial
structure effect; improved terms of trade, an income
effect. Only the income effects are amenable to di-
rect calculation of values. But the limitations caused
by this should not be exaggerated. All trade nego-
tiation calculations depend on challengeable assump-
tions. Most of the calculations have identified roughly
the same major losers and the same commodities
where changes in tariffs were most likely to cause
losses.1
Identifying solutions. From the beginning there
were two approaches to dealing with this problem,
to create some mechanism to deliver aid within the
WTO or to leave it to the normal processes of aid.
Broadly speaking, those from the trade community
favoured the first, while those from donors, includ-
ing the World Bank and the IMF, favoured the
second, or simply assumed that this was the only
possibility, as there is no existing mechanism within
the WTO.
Losses as a result of trade policy change have
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tory action in the WTO. When a regional trade area
is formed, for example, non-member countries which
lose market access can ask for compensatory tariff
reductions in other areas. Similarly, if countries win
a dispute, and the “offending” country does not
change its policy, they can take trade measures
against it. There is, however, no WTO provision for
monetary compensation. But for preference erosion,
it became clear that trade compensation was not
possible.2
Financial compensation has been proposed in
the disputes procedures, where there are no obvious
retaliatory actions to take (or where the country en-
titled to them does not want to damage its own
welfare by restricting imports). It was implied in the
agreement in the Uruguay Round that Net Food
Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC), who
were expected to be hurt by a rise in food prices as a
consequence of the agricultural reforms, should get
special consideration. Some expected the interna-
tional financial institutions to offer adjustment
assistance. In practice, no action has been taken on
this, by either the WTO or financial and donor insti-
tutions, principally because of the lack of clear
allocation of responsibility for taking any action, but
also because it has not been clear that the reforms
had clear consequences for prices.
The normal WTO negotiation answer to meet
the consequences of preference erosion would be to
expect the countries requesting a reduction in tar-
iffs, in this case principally the non-preferred
developing countries, such as Brazil and the Group
of Twenty (G20), along with some efficient devel-
oped country producers, like Australia and the Cairns
Group, to make an offer that will secure agreement.
They could either offer to fund adjustment in the
losers themselves or demand that the developed
countries, which created the problem by combining
high protection with deep preferences, compensate
the losers. The evolution of AfT, as long as it was
within the Doha Round, corresponded to the latter.3
The IMF (2003a: 14–15) instead attempted to
analyse the question in terms of its principles for
aid. This difference in approach between the aid
approach, of assuming consensus on criteria and
goals, and the trade approach, of negotiating to find
a balance between different interests, has remained
a fundamental stumbling block in all the discussions
of Aid for Trade. Should the distribution of com-
pensation follow development criteria or be related
to the size of any trade costs? There is also the ques-
tion of how to offset private losses (to export
revenue) by means of transfers to governments, with-
out raising the same issues which are being contested
in the context of the allocation of anti-dumping du-
ties in the United States.
The IMF concluded:
... it could be argued that preference erosion
represents an adverse exogenous shock simi-
lar to those arising from reductions in prices
of commodities … But there are at least three
differences with commodity shocks that are
germane to the design of any financing ar-
rangement. First, shocks from preference ero-
sion are likely to be permanent … Second,
shocks from preference erosion can be antici-
pated ex ante. Third, they are likely to be
spread out over time because of the phased
nature of MFN tariff reductions.
The first distinguishing feature – the perma-
nent nature of the shock – suggests that ad-
justment needs to be an integral part of any
response, including financing, to preference
erosion. There would therefore be a presump-
tion that any financing of losses from prefer-
ence erosion should be within the context of
adjustment facilities and program financing by
the international financial institutions, which
ensures that appropriate adjustment actions
accompany any financing.
In the case of commodity price shocks, the
point has been made that disbursement needs
to be quick, rendering financing under a Fund
arrangement, which can typically be time-con-
suming, unwieldy and inappropriate. The sec-
ond and third distinguishing features – the
predictability and the gradual nature of the
shock – make this critique less valid. Because
preference erosion can be anticipated well in
advance and the actual loss from it is spread
out, a medium-term adjustment facility might
well be the most appropriate way of combin-
ing the financing and adjustment. Since such
facilities already exist, and given the limited
nature of the likely losses, it would not seem
necessary to create new financing facilities.
This is quoted at length because it remains the
fundamental argument of those who favour using
existing aid instruments. But the IMF itself, during
2003, increasingly realised that the existing facilities
were not appropriate for the problem. Immediately
before Cancún, the IMF and World Bank offered
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adjustment needs in the Doha Round”. A joint letter
from the World Bank President and IMF Managing
Director (IMF, 2003b) said that they “appreciate that
adjusting to a more liberal trade environment may
impose costs on some of our member countries –
albeit temporarily – as a result of preference ero-
sion, the loss of tariff revenue or other factors”. They
offered to help members “to assess the nature and
magnitude of any adjustment need”, to “assist in
designing policies” to adjust, “to use and tailor our
lending authority to respond to the specific chal-
lenges posed by the Doha Development Agenda”,
and “to provide support in mobilizing donor re-
sources”. At Cancún the IMF (Krueger, 2003) offered
“a new trade initiative ... specifically tailored to ad-
dress temporary external imbalances that might result
from the multilateral trade reforms.” It held discus-
sions with the countries it had identified as potentially
most seriously affected. In 2004, it extended its ini-
tial analysis of LDCs to Middle Income countries
(Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004), and created the
promised new facility, the Trade Integration Mecha-
nism (TIM) (IMF, 2004) for balance of payments
problems arising from trade liberalization. It has been
used by three countries.
In contrast, the World Bank has always been
more sceptical about whether the problem existed,
and about whether special measures were needed. It
(World Bank, 2003) emphasized that most poor in
developing countries were not in the preference de-
pendent countries or LDCs, so that measures to help
these did not meet the major needs (World Bank,
2003: 306). It thought that preference erosion could
be largely compensated by expansion in other exports,4
and judged that trade facilitation and more liberal rules
of origin would “attenuate the impact” (World Bank,
2003: 218). It noted the problems of food importers
if food prices rise (World Bank, 2003: xvii), but again
expected other improvements to balance this.
Following the increasing IMF interest during
mid-2003 and the suggestion in the United States/
EU/Canada position paper on non-agricultural mar-
ket access (WTO, 2003d) that these major countries
supported action “to address adjustment needs of
Members whose exports are significantly affected
by erosion of preferences”, there was a temporary
reversal of the World Bank position when it joined
the IMF offer of support pre-Cancún. The World
Bank (Zhang, 2003), however, presented its propos-
als more as an extension of existing programmes,
for example on trade logistics, than a new facility.
The WTO, in comments by the then Director Gen-
eral Supachai, additionally raised the issue of those
who would need to adjust to the end of the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement.
The cotton producers had suggested one mecha-
nism to give a formal link between the costs imposed
by cotton subsidies and a source of funds. It was not
immediately clear, however, how this could be ex-
tended to the other “losers” in the negotiations, even
if the principle of allowing a financial arrangement
in a trade agreement could be accepted. For the cot-
ton case, those subsidising are clearly taking measures
that would not normally be considered legitimate
interferences with trade, and they are high income
developed countries, so direct compensation seemed
possible. But in the case of normal trade liberaliza-
tion, many of the gainers are developing countries
with large numbers of poor people, and are not re-
sponsible for the damage to the losers.
It is the previous system of high trade barriers
and preferences, set up by the developed countries,
which is responsible for the vulnerability to loss.
Transfers from the developed countries would be
appropriate to prevent reductions in income, to meet
the long term developmental objective of helping
the losers increase their exports without dependence
on preferences, and to provide a substitute for the
preferences which have been presented as forms of
assistance to developing countries.
Various groups considered possible solutions
before Cancún. Most position papers suggested other
types of trade access or postponing or avoiding the
liberalization that might cause the problems. The
second draft proposals on agricultural access, for
example, suggested maintaining “to the maximum
extent technically feasible” nominal margins of tar-
iff preferences (WTO, 2003a). As the impracticality
(and injustice) of these proposals were recognized,
after June 2003, some groups moved into asking for
compensation payments as well. The Least Devel-
oped (WTO, 2003e) suggested “the establishment
of compensatory or other appropriate mechanisms,
including measures that promote exports of LDCs”,
and the ACP (WTO, 2003f) repeated this, and also
asked that “Technical and financial assistance should
be provided [sic: it did not attempt to say by whom
or how] to ACP States for improving infrastructure,
productivity and diversification, and for development
of facilities and systems to achieve compliance
with ... SPS and TBT requirements”.13 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
Following the collapse at Cancún, which was
attributed in part to the fears by some developing
countries that they would lose from the proposals
then on the table and the concerns by a great many
more countries that they had little to gain, there was
more pressure on both developed and developing
countries to find new solutions.
On one point, the cost of implementing new
WTO rules, there was clear progress in 2004. Devel-
oping countries had requested a binding commitment
to provide additional funding required to meet rule
changes. This was not accepted, but the July 2004
framework for WTO negotiations (WTO, 2004)
moved in that direction. In the one new area included,
Trade Facilitation, there was, as well as clauses like
the much-criticized “best endeavours” commitments
on technical assistance in the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment, in addition for the first time in a WTO agree-
ment an acceptance that “in cases where required
support and assistance for such infrastructure is not
forthcoming, and where a developing or least-
developed Member continues to lack the necessary
capacity, implementation will not be required.”
In the United Kingdom, the International De-
velopment Committee of the House of Commons
(IDC) recognized “moral, historical, and legal re-
sponsibilities” of the EU to the African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) countries that have received pref-
erences or benefited from subsidies, and drew the
analogy of compensation for expansion of the EU
(IDC, 2003: 36). In 2004, a study was commissioned
for the Swedish Government to find new forms of
special and differential treatment that could offer
developing countries real gains in trade (Kleen and
Page, 2005). It concluded that:
... some countries will have a measurable nega-
tive outcome from any significant liberalisa-
tion of trade because their losses from prefer-
ence erosion will be greater than their gains
from other parts of the agreements, so that only
financial assistance can give them a positive
outcome. Compensating them through a fund,
rather than other trade concessions would be
a major new initiative for the WTO, and one
that could seem inconsistent both with its role
as a trade agency and with other funding by
developed countries, through their aid pro-
grammes and the international financial insti-
tutions. The reason for suggesting it is that the
other proposals for dealing with the problem
of preference erosion are more unsatisfactory
and more difficult. (Kleen and Page, 2005:
100–101)
In particular, it noted that :
Asking aid donors to treat it as a special aid
problem is unlikely to work well because aid
agencies have other priorities (in some cases,
formally established).
Also in 2004, the Government of the United
Kingdom commissioned studies to estimate the costs
to sugar and banana exporters of changes in the pref-
erence regimes for these (Gillson et al., 2004), which
helped to motivate action by the European Commis-
sion (EC). Its Action Plan (EC, 2005) would be
widely seen as a possible precedent for AfT in the
WTO. In January 2005, the EU recognized the prin-
ciple that countries which had benefited from
preferential trade because of EU policies on sugar
should be “supported” to adjust to changes in these.
In presenting its Action Plan, it noted that “Several
ACP economies are significantly dependent on sugar
exports to the EU”. They have made investments
and development plans based on expectations about
these. It suggested combining “trade and develop-
ment measures” to meet the “challenges”. In
proposing that the assistance be used to improve the
competitiveness of countries’ sugar sectors, to pro-
mote diversification away from sugar, and to assist
adjustment more generally, it directly substituted
development assistance for preferences.
From the end of 2004 to the first half of 2005,
a group of experts chaired by Ernesto Zedillo exam-
ined what developing countries could gain from the
Round, and concluded that Aid for Trade was an
essential part of a package to rescue the Round and
ensure that developing countries gained (Zedillo,
2005): “A significant increase in ‘aid for trade’ –
that is, development assistance dedicated to increas-
ing the recipient country’s capacity for trade – would
help to ensure that more countries benefit from trade
opportunities, including those that derive from uni-
lateral reforms.” It also argued for “Adopting an
approach to negotiations that helps governments of
developing countries to put in place the policies and
undertake the investments they need to benefit from
implementation of WTO rules.” It suggested that two
essential conditions for substantial liberalization
were internal mechanisms to compensate losers and
“In the case of losses from the erosion of trade pref-
erences, preference-granting countries should take
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It explicitly rejected the alternative approach,
of finding new preferences: “Seeking to address pref-
erence erosion concerns within the trade negotiating
agenda is likely to be counterproductive.” The con-
sultations leading to this paper had involved unofficial
representatives of the World Bank and the IMF, of
some major EU donors, and of African negotiators,
as well as academic experts. It helped to define the
terms in which AfT would be discussed in the WTO’s
Task Force in the first half of 2006.
The WTO research department had also started
to calculate the costs of preference erosion (Low et
al., 2005; 2006).
At the April 2005 meetings of the IMF and the
World Bank (World Bank and IMF, 2005a), these
organizations were instructed to consult with others
on AfT before the September 2005 meetings. They
asked two ambassadors to the WTO, from Sweden
and Rwanda, to consult the ambassadors there on
“the need for aid for trade”. Ambassadors Mia Horn
af Rantzien (who had organized a meeting on the
report to the Swedish Government on special and
differential treatment and who would later chair the
WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade) and Valentine
Rugwabiza (who would, as Deputy Director Gen-
eral of the WTO, lead the drafting process to put
AfT on the Hong Kong agenda) attempted to iden-
tify areas of consensus on possible solutions. They
identified “three pillars” for Aid for Trade (World
Bank and IMF, 2005b):
(i) enhancing the in-country trade development
agenda (in broadest sense) via the Integrated
Framework (IF) approach;
(ii) creating a multilateral fund with the aim of pro-
viding more predictable and credible financing
to respond to the prioritised trade-related needs
assessment; and
(iii) a separate “window” for specific adjustment
issues affecting certain countries arising from
MFN liberalization (notably on preference ero-
sion, but also other issues could be considered,
including loss of fiscal revenues).
Assistance under all pillars is envisaged as tak-
ing more the form of grants and other forms of
assistance, as opposed to loans, over a 10 year period.
They saw the first pillar as an enhanced ver-
sion of the Integrated Framework, and in an
interesting precursor of the emphasis that the Task
Force would place on regional needs, quoted a pro-
gramme by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) as a precedent. They saw a need for a new
fund because: “the first pillar does not provide an
assurance that … [the] priorities [it identifies] will
be met. Developing countries have frequently ex-
pressed concern that donor follow-up to the identified
supply-side priorities has been insufficient.”
The IMF and World Bank responded in Sep-
tember 2005. They accepted the need to help
countries trade and the argument that promoting trade
could be an international public good. They accepted
the arguments for an enhanced Integrated Frame-
work, but rejected the proposals for a separate fund
and a separate window for adjustment. They argued
that “full and faithful implementation” of the IF
would make a new fund unnecessary with the possi-
ble exception of funding for regional needs. For
these, it agreed to look at the possibility of a new
fund. But they had “serious misgivings about the
desirability and effectiveness of a separate fund to
address adjustment, given the availability of exist-
ing mechanisms and the need to consider adjustment
as part of an overall package of domestic policy re-
forms and economic planning.” This effectively
rejected both the criticisms by the Geneva based
ambassadors (and others) that the “existing mecha-
nisms” neglected trade and the argument that there
was a need to provide designated trade funding in
order to ensure that countries agreed to trade liber-
alization. By saying that any support for adjustment
would follow “analyses of adjustment impact” by
their staffs, and should not be directly tied to WTO
shocks, but considered in the context of other poli-
cies, they rejected the arguments for predictability.
Following this, Zambia (the country which
would lead the LDCs at the Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference) denounced the World Bank and IMF
reaction as “totally inadequate” and presented an
LDC proposal on Aid for Trade (Patel, 2005). This
accepted the three pillars of the Geneva proposal,
and added a fourth: support to deal with debt. It ac-
cepted liberalization as an objective, but argued that
improving supply capacity and finding alternative
sources of revenue were essential prerequisites. It
made detailed proposals on how to identify produc-
tive and infrastructure needs and the adjustment
financing required.
In spite of the official views of the World Bank,
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ence at which researchers and international organi-
zations presented evidence on preference erosion
(ODI database). In one of the papers a member of
its research department, with an official of the United
Kingdom, Department for International Develop-
ment (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005: 8), reviewed the
evidence on the likely risks of preference erosion,
and concluded that “‘Less preferred’ countries are
increasingly concerned about the discrimination they
confront, while ‘more preferred’ developing coun-
tries worry that WTO-based liberalization of trade
will erode the value of current preferential access
regimes. This tension suggests there is a political
economy case for preference-granting countries to
explicitly address erosion fears. We argue that the
appropriate instrument for this is development as-
sistance. The alternative of addressing erosion
concerns through the trading system will generate
additional discrimination and trade distortions, rather
than moving the WTO towards a more liberal, non-
discriminatory regime.”
In Geneva, there was still support among ne-
gotiators (from developed and developing countries)
for a separate fund for AfT, in spite of (virtually the
same) countries’ formal acceptance of the World
Bank and IMF rejection of it. In the final stages of
preparation for the Hong Kong Ministerial, the WTO
convened an informal group of ambassadors, under
the former Rwanda ambassador, now Deputy DG,
Rugwabiza, to consider what could be included in
the Hong Kong deliberations on this.
A draft proposed before the Hong Kong Min-
isterial was considered in informal meetings at the
Hong Kong Ministerial and amended to give a clear
process: a Task Force to prepare a report to the Gen-
eral Council on “operationalizing” AfT and instructions
to the Director General to identify what donors could
do, before a discussion in the General Council. The
concern of many countries that AfT might be con-
sidered a replacement for liberalization in the Doha
Round led to the constant repetition of the phrase
seen in the Horn af Rantzien, Rugwabiza report in
2005 (World Bank and IMF, 2005b): it is a comple-
ment to, not a substitute for, a successful round.
The World Bank continued to state its opposi-
tion to a special facility for trade at the Hong Kong
Ministerial (WTO, 2005b). Once it became clear
following the Hong Kong Ministerial that AfT would
have an official existence, however, the Bank ac-
tively participated in discussions and clearly wanted
an implementing role similar to the one it has ac-
quired in the Integrated Framework.5, 6
3.3 The Aid for Trade Task Force
The work of the Task Force. Following the Hong
Kong conference, a Task Force7 was appointed by
the Director General. From a WTO governance point
of view, it is interesting to note that the members
were chosen to include the major countries, devel-
oped and developing, plus the chairs or representatives
of the various informal groups of developing coun-
tries (Africa, LDCs, ACPs, Small and Vulnerable
Economies). The risk of this system is that coun-
tries which are not members of prominent groups
are neglected. Following protests in the General
Council about the original proposed composition,
two additional members were added, Colombia and
Thailand, middle income countries which, although
not normal aid recipients, might expect to be included
in a trade-related facility. (Colombia had been a
member of the pre-Hong Kong Ministerial drafting
group; the current ambassador was also chair of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism committee.) Prior
to the meetings of the Task Force, the WTO secre-
tariat drafted a Concept Paper on Aid for Trade
(WTO, 2006a), but the Task Force took the Hong
Kong Ministerial paragraph as its Terms of Refer-
ence. The plan then was for the Director General to
issue a report on his consultations with donors in
May, for discussion in June, thus before the Task
Force Report in July (WTO, 2006a).
The Task Force had to reach consensus among
a range of different views. Developed countries do
not agree on AfT. The EU has supported it in princi-
ple, expecting the IMF or World Bank to implement
it. Within the EU, however, some development min-
istries tend to take the same position as the World
Bank. There is support on the trade side, and its
Action Plan for sugar has many of the elements now
proposed for AfT, of allocation to countries accord-
ing to adjustment need, and with the possibility of
using the funds to provide support either for those
incurring losses or for new products. Internally, the
EU has accepted the need for “cohesion funds” and
for transfers from those who gain from integration
to those who lose, and it has schemes to compensate
farmers both in the EU and in the ACP countries
who will lose income because of changes in the sugar
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 Those who believe that it is mainly the prefer-
ences offered by EU which are the problem do not
see any obligation to share in any cost of compen-
sating for these. The United States has been anxious
to avoid any transfer of the costs of erosion of EU
preferences to international funding. It has accepted
a special responsibility for helping the cotton coun-
tries of West Africa.
The World Bank in its input into the Task Force
(WTO, 2006d, the inputs to the Task Force; see also
the summaries in WTO, 2006c; International Cen-
tre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD),
2006; and ODI, 2006) identified three areas where
there was insufficient trade-related funding, on the
IF, on regional and cross-country issues, and for as-
sessing (sic: not for meeting) adjustment needs. But
(WTO, 2006d: 5) it has an interesting comment on a
need “to have a clear commitment from all donors
to assist countries where the adjustment costs are
deemed to be significant” so there does now seem
to be support for including adjustment costs even
from former opponents. It also noted that there was
a problem for trade initiatives of “lack of ownership
at the country level (by both donor agencies and
country authorities)”.
One country, Mauritius, had already started
negotiating with the World Bank for Aid for Trade
funds in 2006. The Bank mentioned this as an ex-
ample, but did not note that this illustrated a problem
with its preference for “country-led” approaches: that
funds may go preferentially to the countries that are
most skilled at identifying their needs and packag-
ing them to fit new aid programmes.
The IMF position was similar to that for the
World Bank, with perhaps even less belief in a need
to increase funding. Again, it thought that existing
mechanisms were adequate.
In its submission (OECD, 2006) the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) argued that AfT was already increasing
(“The aid volume is not the issue”), and could be
expected to continue to do. The problem is to make
it more effective through local accountability, where
“local” is taken to include donors. (It did not share
the World Bank’s concerns about donors.) It has
consistently argued that there are “compelling rea-
sons to refrain from creating a new institutional
mechanism for the financing and allocation of
aid-for-trade” because this would “separate the trade-
related agenda from the broader economic growth
agenda”.
Three of the contributions came from organi-
zations for which trade is a central interest, and their
expertise and experience were clear. The Interna-
tional Trade Centre (ITC) made a strong case that
there was inadequate attention to trade because
policy makers were not convinced of its importance,
and in particular there was insufficient attention to
“developing entrepreneurial activity and trade-ena-
bling environments”. It had detailed suggestions for
involving the private sector. The United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization (UNIDO) looked
particularly at the need to work on standards and to
work with the private sector, what it called “the tech-
nical infrastructure”. It provided lists of what countries
need, in contrast to the approach that says that do-
nors should wait for countries to identify their needs.
It thought it more important to identify what could
make developing country exports competitive than
to do more calculations of preference erosion etc.
The Inter-American Development Bank described
its own experience of trade support, and argued that
there has been neglect of supply side capacity. It set
up a separate unit to deliver trade-related technical
assistance and actively encouraged integrating trade
into countries’ development programmes. It also ar-
gued that a lack of “grant funding for trade-related
assistance to middle-income countries is a serious
challenge”, and that what is available is not predict-
able because it is budgeted annually. It joined the
others in citing the lack of regional finance, but also
saw a lack of a “flexible ‘rapid response’ facility” (a
problem first mentioned in IMF, 2003a), a contrast to
the long-term programming suggested by the Bank
and the Fund.
The other international organizations were less
original, repeating the principles of aid or describ-
ing existing programmes.
The Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVE)
(with a seat on the Task Force) stressed the general
“trade challenges” that they face (high transport
costs, high trade dependency, high infrastructure
costs, etc.), rather than any specifically related to the
WTO or the Doha Round. They also argued that AfT
should be mainly through grants to avoid increasing
debt. For administration, it wanted an extension of
the IF process to other countries, and argued that
“another added advantage is that the United Nations
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IF funds, rather than one of the Bretton Woods finan-
cial institutions. This would avoid the introduction
of those institutional conditionalities in this context.”
This distrust of World Bank as the lead institution
was not confined to the SVEs. The ACP also men-
tioned the need for grant support and cited the IF as
a good model. The EC paper dealt specifically with
how to involve the private sector in AfT.
Brazil (a member of the Task Force) stressed
that resources should be additional and uncondi-
tional, to facilitate adjustment. It defined separate
areas for coordination by the World Bank and the
IMF, rather than seeing a single central role. AfT
should not be “a bargaining tool”. Colombia, sup-
ported by Ecuador and Peru, like Brazil and the
specialized agencies, supported a project-based ap-
proach. It particularly stressed that it should not be
necessary to assess needs ex ante because these
would depend on the course of the negotiations. This
approach wants AfT to meet specific needs, rather
than as part of a general development strategy. As
such aid is likely to be a much smaller proportion of
middle income countries’ budgets than in the coun-
tries where the Bank normally intervenes, it is
important to be aware of this different approach.
Zambia, for the LDCs, again suggested Value
Chain analysis as a tool for identifying needs and
also of involving the private sector. This falls be-
tween the approach of AfT in the context of a full
national development programme and the project-
based approach.
What the Task force recommended (for full text
see WTO, 2006e). The Task Force defined the scope
of what could be funded under AfT as “activities …
identified as trade-related development priorities in
the recipient country’s national development strate-
gies.” It listed those that it thought would qualify,
partly by reference to the OECD/WTO database on
past trade-related aid which covers mainly training
and institutional support, but it added infrastructure
and more general spending on adjustment which
could include creating productive capacity.
It did not recommend a new agency to admin-
ister AfT, but made clear its dissatisfaction with the
existing mechanisms. It criticised donors for neglect-
ing trade and failing to understand its needs, leading
to inadequate support for infrastructure and meet-
ing the costs of adjustment, and for inadequate
attention to regional needs. Without formally pro-
posing new institutions (its rather odd phrasing was
“A National Aid-for-Trade Committee could be es-
tablished” and: “Explore the merits of establishing
a Regional Aid-for-Trade Committee”), it did rec-
ommend better coordination mechanisms at country,
regional, and multinational level. The principal role
for the WTO would be to monitor the overall and
country performance of other agencies.
It did not deal in detail with either the quantity
or the nature of financing, as these were (under the
Hong Kong mandate) the responsibility of the WTO
Director General. The Recommendations of the Task
Force state that they are dependent on the provision
of “substantial additional targeted resources” (sec-
tion C), but they do not set up a mechanism to secure
this either in the immediate future or in the long run.
There is no recommendation that donors should bind
the funds that they have announced, even in terms
of each agency rather than under WTO rules.
3.4 Aid for Trade separates from
the Doha Round
The Hong Kong mandate implied a strong link
between it and the Doha Round: it was to “contrib-
ute to the development dimension of the DDA” and
be complementary to trade changes. But it also ar-
gued that AfT should aim to help developing
countries “more broadly to expand their trade”, and
in spite of the suspension of negotiations, WTO
members have agreed that AfT should go ahead. By
the time the Task Force reported in July, it was clear
that negotiations might stall, so while it repeats the
mantra that AfT should be complementary to the
Round, not a substitute for it, it also stretched the
ordinary meaning of words to produce a variant on
this: “Aid for Trade is a complement to the Doha
Round, but it is not conditional upon its success.” It
urged that it begin “as soon as possible”.
In October 2006, the WTO General Council
accepted the Task Force’s report, and endorsed the
recommendations. At its December 2006 meeting,
the WTO Director General emphasized the WTO’s
role in “promoting coherence” (WTO, 2006g)
through monitoring AfT. This would largely use the
existing OECD/WTO data base, but the WTO could
also use direct reports to the Committee on Trade
and Development by development agencies and
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include assessments of AfT for donors and recipi-
ents in Trade Policy Reviews and to hold an annual
debate in the General Council starting autumn 2007,
following up two of the Task Force recommenda-
tions, and to establish a committee of donor agencies.
In September 2006, the IMF and the World Bank
agreed that there should be improved coordination
of regional aid, but rejected any new institutions
(World Bank and IMF, 2006).
3.5 What Aid for Trade is needed and
what the Task Force proposed 8
The Task Force tried to ensure that AfT met
WTO-related and general needs. Funding countries
to implement commitments made in the Doha Round
had already been recognized as a potential cost of a
Doha settlement in the July 2004 decision. And funds
for implementation of the commitments in the Uru-
guay Round were a basic demand of developing
countries. This includes commitments under the
Marrakech Declaration for the costs imposed by
agricultural liberalization on Net Food Importing
Developing Countries. But any targeted assistance
causes problems in normal aid terms. While imple-
menting WTO agreements may benefit a country in
the medium term, and it may benefit its trading part-
ners, some of which will also be developing coun-
tries, it is not necessarily a country priority for a
cash-constrained government; accepting the commit-
ment is therefore a “cost” of entering the WTO agree-
ment. It would be based on targeted project assistance,
not be part of a country proposal. Helping countries
to adjust to higher food prices could be close to aid
objectives, if it is part of a development programme.
The costs of adjusting to preference erosion or
to the fiscal costs of liberalizing a country’s own
imports would raise serious problems for normal aid
funding. The absence of a Doha agreement means,
of course, that there will be lower costs than origi-
nally anticipated. But the fact the Round is stalled
does not mean that there will be no erosion of pref-
erences: some special schemes will be ended or
reduced (sugar, bananas); unilateral and bilateral lib-
eralization will reduce the value of preferences;
existing preference schemes may be modified.
On the non-WTO-related needs, the develop-
mental case is clear, so there is less need to modify
aid criteria: that countries need infrastructure, insti-
tutions, technical capacity, investment, etc., in or-
der to trade, both in general and in the specific case
of new liberalization under the WTO. Trade capac-
ity building includes “mainstreaming” trade into
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (many
of which had ignored trade, Gillson and Hewitt,
2003) and development plans, assistance in and train-
ing for trade negotiations, and other capacity build-
ing relevant to trade-related policies. There are
different problems here. Within this, assistance to
negotiate, which has been a very conspicuous part
of trade-related aid, including under the IF, may be
particularly difficult to incorporate into a WTO-re-
lated programme. Emphasizing the donor-recipient
relationship can distort trade negotiations.
A second problem comes from the need to build
up the capacity of governments to link domestic
policy ministries and trade ministries (Vitalis, 2006).
This approach sometimes leads to a government
policy model that gives great weight to consultation
networks with “civil society”, and less weight to
constitutional representative bodies. While this is a
potential problem in all types of aid, it may be particu-
larly serious in trade because of the well-established
risk that the benefits from trade are dispersed and
the costs concentrated, so that vocal interest groups
may not be representative.
Support for institutions that improve capacity
to trade, not only at country, but at regional and/or
other country group level (e.g. regional banks or The
Advisory Centre on World Trade Law) is clearly aid-
eligible as capacity building, but there have been
problems in getting support for multi-country projects.
If it is not directly tied to current negotiations, it is
less likely to be subject to conflicts of interest.
Support for infrastructure and other measures
to build countries’ ability to trade may be also being
needed at regional as well as country level. There is
a particular need for infrastructure based on regional
needs because the country-based nature of most aid
programmes makes it difficult to identify and fund
cross-country projects. This can include regional
facilities such as ports or bilateral arrangements such
as a road from a land-locked country to a port. Again,
there have been problems in adapting country-based
aid programmes to regional needs.
Finally, there is a need for support for the sup-
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enterprise in new export (or import replacing) ar-
eas. Arguably this is normal adjustment to changes
in trade opportunities (or to current opportunities),
so it does not necessarily require a special aid pro-
gramme. It is difficult to reconcile aid to the private
sector, which might involve picking some companies
to benefit, with current fashions in aid or develop-
ment theory which distrust “picking winners”, but
the specialist agencies have experience in this.
AfT could cover any or all of these categories.
But it is not appropriate to estimate the needs (or the
supply of funds) by adding them together. The cat-
egories of adjustment costs from food prices,
preference erosion, and fiscal losses identify needs
for support, but they do not define what the funds
would be used for. While a purely trade negotiation
approach would imply offering countries cash pay-
ments to replace their gains from low food prices or
preferences, the nature of aid relations and the de-
linking of AfT from the negotiations suggest that
the payments will be conditional on their use for a
need identified from the non-WTO-related list.
Another way of classifying the needs identi-
fied here is the range from low cost specific projects
to major infrastructure investment. These are likely
to require different types of organizations and pro-
grammes to meet them. Needs that are small and
easily defined (for example: assessments of new cir-
cumstances or institutional reform to meet particular
implementation needs, often to a deadline) require
an organization able to offer quick disbursement,
probably with a minimum of conditionality or plan-
ning. Others require longer term and more considered
programmes, to ensure that building the supply ca-
pacity to trade is well integrated into a country’s (and
perhaps a region’s) development programme.
The Task Force recommendations (WTO,
2006e) could be interpreted as covering all the needs
identified here. It categorizes them, drawing on the
OECD/WTO data base classification as (section D):
• Trade policy and regulations
• Trade development
• Trade-related infrastructure
• Building productive capacity
• Trade-related adjustment
• Other trade-related needs.
The “adjustment” category could include ad-
justment to preference erosion, higher food prices,
and loss of tariff revenue as the objectives include
helping countries to “adjust to trade reform and lib-
eralization” (section F.1). There was no formal
coordination between the work of the Task Force and
negotiations on Agriculture or non-agricultural mar-
ket access to allocate some or all responsibility for
dealing with preference erosion or food costs to AfT.
The Task Force recommendations follow the
Hong Kong Declaration in specifying that AfT is
for “developing countries, particularly LDCs”. They
do not suggest any categories other than this. They
do not suggest any a priori allocation by country.
Their recommendations would be consistent
with either a project-based or a programme alloca-
tion, but they show a preference for defining trade
needs through a general country or country/donor
planning process (section F.5.1). This contrasts with
the emphasis on targeted, quick-disbursing funds in
some vertical funds (see below) or in successful prec-
edents for trade-related aid by the regional develop-
ment banks. They emphasize the need for donors to
reform their mechanisms to meet the demand for
trade-related assistance more effectively.
The Task Force places particular emphasis on
the need to consider regional needs, and thus directly
meets one identified gap in current aid (sections F.3,
F.5.2). It does not explicitly mention the problem
that some of the needs closely related to WTO agree-
ments (for example the costs of implementing trade
facilitation requirements) or some adjustment costs
might not fit the mandates of aid donors, because
their immediate purpose is to meet international ob-
ligations, not to promote a country’s development
in accordance with a nationally adopted plan. It deals
with it by implication by providing for “clearing
house functions” to meet unfunded needs.20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
4. Financial issues
4.1 Predictability
The Task Force stated that “Additional, predict-
able, sustainable and effective financing is fundamen-
tal for fulfilling the Aid-for-Trade mandate.” As long
as there was a link to the negotiations, there was an
argument that countries would need sufficient con-
fidence in the aid pledges made in 2006 to sign up
to any Doha agreement with the assurance that their
costs and adjustment needs will be met. Therefore,
there would have to be a formal agreement (in aid
programmes, if not in the WTO) on the level and
allocation of financing. This negotiating need, how-
ever, is no longer relevant and the fact that trade-
related aid has increased in recent years, without a
“Global Trade Fund” could suggest that donors now
agree that there is a need to spend more on trade,
and therefore that a specific “trade” fund is not
needed. But the history of aid flows shifting from
one priority to another suggests that those who sup-
port more AfT may justifiably feel a need to ensure
that the increased shares to trade are sustained.
The history of disappointment in the implemen-
tation of “best endeavours” commitments in both
trade and aid pledges means that the current genera-
tion of aid donors faces demands for stronger
commitments because of the failures of the past. The
fundamental argument for a multilateral trade sys-
tem, that it provides certainty and predictability,
suggests that assistance to help countries take ad-
vantage of it should also have those qualities. There
is also increasing support in aid theory for provid-
ing predictable flows of funds, and the Initiative for
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) had some
success in offering funds tied to broad areas, such as
education and health.
The experience since the Uruguay Round also
shows the need for formal commitments. While small
costs, particularly those easily tied to a need for spe-
cific spending (customs rules, for example) did
attract additional aid, those which require a macr-
oeconomic approach both to calculate them and to
find a way of meeting them (adjustment needs fol-
lowing on the terms of trade change in agriculture)
were left to one side. Another reason for commit-
ments to be important is the problem, discussed
above, that some donors question whether imple-
mentation costs should receive aid money.
This means that there may be a need for new
funds, with new criteria, either as designated parts
of individual donors’ programmes (the EU Action
Plan for Sugar, for example) or in a new multilateral
form (HIPC, the vertical funds in health). Even if
countries cannot require certainty through a WTO
agreement, they can ask for it through aid mecha-
nisms. The WTO arrangements as currently proposed
(see section 4.5) do not provide this.
4.2 Grants or loans
Although any financing provided on the basis
of the adjustment costs of trade liberalization might
be used for purposes and in countries that would
normally expect loan, not grant terms, the fact that
countries need this additional finance for reasons of
benefit to others and as a replacement for previous
transfers suggests that there is a need for at least
some of this to be on concessional terms. Countries
which lose preferences need non-repayable support
in order to be able to make the investments in physi-
cal and human infrastructure and in productive
capacity to permit alternative production, adapted
to the new trading conditions. The Trade Integra-
tion Mechanism of the IMF (IMF TIM) is not the
answer to a permanent loss of income, and more debt
is the last thing such countries need. Both equity
(the countries themselves do not gain from the cost)
and financial considerations (there is no identifiable
return) suggest that the financing should be on grant
terms for any developing country incurring signifi-
cant costs. Hong Kong paragraph 57 suggests that
AfT should be “where appropriate through grants or
concessional loans”.
For other needs, whether loans or grants are
appropriate should be decided in the context of nor-
mal aid criteria. It will depend on the income level
of the country and on the use of the funds. For as-
sistance to private sector production or infrastructure
of a type which can recover its costs, there may be a
clear source of returns to repay a loan. For assist-
ance to government capacity to negotiate or to build
new institutions, there can be expected to be a re-
turn to the country as a whole, but not an identified
income stream.
Public goods arguments provide another rea-
son for grants. They tend to be under-supplied if left
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be captured by the provider of the good. This prob-
lem can be met by rules requiring their provision,
but, particularly in developing countries, there is
likely to be a need for subsidy, and therefore for some
financing not to be on fully commercial terms. Many
trade needs for aid have at least some characteris-
tics of public goods or goods with strong external
effects. The generally recognized types of public
goods are governance, knowledge, health, security
and environment (te Velde and Morrissey, 2005).
Broader definitions would include transportation and
communication (at least in part), while some types
of production have important external effects (the
arguments for the effects of industrialization or clus-
ters of activities, for example). Of the types of trade
assistance identified as in need of aid, trade policy
and regulations contribute to governance in both
national and international trade rules, and research
on these contributes to knowledge. Training in trade
also contributes to knowledge, while infrastructure
could contribute to the broadly defined public goods.
Aid to help countries to adjust could, if it makes it
easier to secure international agreements, contrib-
ute to any public good benefits from a more well-
governed and more liberal international trading
system. The World Bank and IMF have argued that
“Overcoming coordination and capacity problems
is not an agenda that lends itself to debt-finance”
(World Bank and IMF, 2006), suggesting that grant
finance may be a necessary pre-condition to devel-
oping the demands for specific projects, even if these
are themselves suitable for loan-finance.9
Most aid for both the OECD/WTO database
categories “Trade Policy and Regulation” and “Trade
Development” has been channelled through grants
over the period 2001–2004 (Calì et al., 2006). Around
92 per cent of $3 billion spent on the former cat-
egory and 85 per cent of $6.9 billion spent on the
latter category were channelled as grants by the do-
nors. In contrast, most infrastructure has been in
loans. For implementation needs, therefore, there
seems to be evidence that donors are willing to treat
this aid as meeting pure costs from which recipient
countries do not gain, and from which they cannot
make repayments. If the other types of adjustment
costs were also treated as appropriate for grants, but
if the spending of those adjustment funds was to be
on adapting, rather than compensating (as defined
above), it would be necessary to increase the share
of infrastructure funded by grants. The share did
increase in 2004 (although entirely because of the
high share of spending in Iraq and Afghanistan) from
about 30 per cent in 2001–2003 to 49 per cent. If the
other adjustment costs were about $2 billion a year,
about 40 per cent of the increase planned in AfT
would need to be in grants.
4.3 Conflicting approaches to conditionality
and to country-based priorities
The discussions of AfT have reflected broader
conflicts in aid between targeting specific areas for
help and taking a broad view of a country’s devel-
opment process, and between donor or internation-
ally determined priorities and country priorities. In
2005, aid donors signed up to principles on harmo-
nization, alignment and ownership and these were
cited in the Task Force recommendations (WTO,
2006e, section F.2) (OECD, 2005). They include:
• Ownership, to respect the right – and responsi-
bility – of the partner country itself to establish
its development agenda, setting out its own
strategies for poverty reduction and growth.
• Alignment, align development assistance with
the development priorities and results-oriented
strategies set out by the partner country and to
progressively depend on partner countries own
systems.
• Harmonisation, to streamline and harmonise
donor policies.
But if there are public good or externalities rea-
sons for aid, neither donors nor recipients should
have complete freedom to decide how aid funds are
used, just as countries have chosen to give up some
of their rights to determine their own trade policies
in return for the benefits of an international system.10
As well as being inconsistent with the principles of
the multilateral trading system (or, indeed, any mul-
tilateral obligations), seeing aid only as a means of
providing general support for all of a country’s needs,
with choices made within this by the country (or
donor) in response to its own identification of pri-
orities, suitable for that country at a particular time,
is directly in conflict with the premise behind both
the donor commitments of increased trade related
aid and the inclusion of paragraph 57 in the Hong
Kong Declaration, that there has been insufficient
aid for trade, not just because of general constraints,
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and country programmes. The existing vertical funds
for environment, health, and other needs show that
trade is not the only area where those outside the aid
process have identified a need for more aid, and show
both the advantages and the disadvantages of solv-
ing the problem by providing finance “tied” to a
particular sector. There is increased knowledge; clear
identification of needs; concentration of resources;
but also distortion and negative effects on other pro-
grammes. There is now an additional problem: once
some vertical funds exist, there is an argument that
other general needs need their own vertical fund in
order to avoid being “crowded out” by the subjects
which have their own facilities.
The conflict may, however, be not between
country-determined agendas and international pri-
orities, but rather one between the priorities of the
international aid community and those of other in-
ternational interests, in trade, but also in health, the
environment, and other areas. In practice, the degree
of intervention by donors to assist countries to pre-
pare their national assessments, to guide recipients
in their choice of projects, and to limit recipients by
specifying their own priorities and what they are will-
ing to fund means that there is still donor intervention
to influence the allocation of aid among sectors.
The Task Force report reflects the inconsistent
trade and aid approaches. Its recommendations for-
mally accept aid principles, and emphasize the need
for a “country-driven” approach based on the Paris
Principles. But the emphasis on ensuring that there
are clear definitions of what is to be included under
AfT and its provision for agencies to identify cross
border needs suggest that it supports designating
funds for trade needs. Its compromise is summarized
in two apparently inconsistent recommendations
(section F.4), that donors and agencies should:
(i) move towards a programme/sector/budget ap-
proach, if country owned, if mainstreamed in
national development strategies and if a robust
system of financial accountability is in place;
(ii) make targeted funds available for building in-
frastructure and removing supply-side con-
straints – over and above capacity building and
technical assistance – perhaps as co-financing
with multilateral development banks.
In particular, it does not resolve the problem of
whether AfT should be offered to countries which
are identified as needing particular types of spend-
ing by some external process, rather than in national
processes. In regional or multi-country programmes,
action by one country may be needed to help an-
other to trade. The importance given to regional
needs, and in particular to the regional development
banks, may imply a less country-programme based
approach.11 Both the Inter-American Development
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have
experience in such lending, and have been less com-
mitted to the PRSP/country strategy approach. They
and the International Trade Centre emphasized this
type of assistance in their presentations to the Task
Force.
There is a long tradition of international aid
having a special responsibility for funding interna-
tional public goods, both because they are not likely
to attract sufficient private funding (for the reasons
outlined above) and because of the role of interna-
tional identification of needs and funding in areas
such as the environment (the Global Environmental
Fund is an interesting precedent). If there is interna-
tional agreement (as demonstrated by WTO com-
mitments) that countries and their economic actors
should be able to participate on an equal basis in
international trade, then funding the necessary pre-
conditions should have a claim on aid funds and,
equally important, countries should be expected to
use available funds to make the necessary invest-
ments. This is, of course, a very different model from
the wholly country-based one of the Paris Declara-
tion, but it is one more consistent with the recogni-
tion (implicit in the founding of GATT and then the
WTO) that countries cannot have complete freedom
to follow any trade policies, regardless of the ef-
fects on other countries. The Zedillo (2005) report
argued that multilateral liberalization itself was a
public good, and therefore if dealing with prefer-
ence erosion was a necessary condition for this, fund-
ing this could be considered support for international
public goods. It considered this public good argu-
ment sufficiently important to give trade objectives
priority over aid principles:
Experience demonstrates the need for a mecha-
nism that provides dedicated funding to ad-
dress the identified constraints on a nation’s
trade competitiveness and to help offset the
adjustment costs of reform. Although the ear-
marking of development assistance is gener-
ally not efficient, we support it in the case of
the trade agenda on the basis of the global
public good argument made earlier.23 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
4.4 How much Aid for Trade is needed?
It is necessary to look in detail at the WTO-
related costs to determine if there are new needs.
For other aid, it would be desirable to look at coun-
tries’ own (or external) assessment of their needs to
trade effectively. This type of evaluation could be
similar in spirit to the diagnostic trade integration
studies carried out under the Integrated Framework,
but extended to identify additional priorities, from
the point of view of the trading system and the trad-
ing needs of its developing country members. This
could permit setting some minimum requirements
under each type of assistance that is identified as
appropriate, with priorities above this to be determined
by other processes. Possible considerations might in-
clude identifying those areas where there is no or
inadequate current funding, as the Task Force found
for regions, those where the needs are largest, and
those countries where the needs seemed greatest.
Given the lack of consensus on an appropriate
methodology, this section does not attempt this;
rather it estimates how much of past aid has been
channelled to trade-related activities in order to pro-
vide a base against which to judge recent pledges
(OECD/DAC Database). This is a substitute for the
“baseline measurement” proposed by the WTO
which has not yet been calculated. That will use
2002–2005 flows as a base (WTO, 2006f). (For fur-
ther details on possible quantification, see WTO and
OECD, 2005; Calì et al., 2006.)
Estimating WTO-related costs. The calculation
is necessarily arbitrary, because of the assumptions
that must be made, and because non-WTO changes,
such as countries’ internal reforms and new bilat-
eral and regional arrangements will also be affecting
costs of trade and the value of preferences. It is im-
possible to have a “right” number. What matters (as
in other WTO rules) is to have an agreed calculation
that gives a “good enough” number to separate coun-
tries into those which are significantly affected and
others.
There are no good estimates of the additional
costs imposed by Uruguay Round rule changes. An
early, widely quoted, World Bank estimate (Finger
and Schuler, 1999) that they would cost LDCs the
equivalent of a year’s development budget was based
on assumptions, not evidence, as the most costly
requirements, on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (WTO-TRIPS), are still not in
force. (They were originally to be required by 2006;
this deadline has now been postponed to 2015.) One
estimate for a non-LDC developing country, Jamaica
(Hoekman et al., 2002) found that implementing the
additional TRIPS rules would cost about $6 million;
implementing the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, another $6 million (mainly to establish an
Agriculture Health and Food Safety Authority), and
new rules on customs valuation, about $1 million.
In the same year, 2002, Jamaica received $24 mil-
lion in official assistance (OECD/DAC, 2004). The
total cost is a significant additional burden in the
short term, even if lower than the high estimates (see
also Sweden National Board of Trade, 2004). These
are once-off, not continuing, costs. Many countries
which are members of regions may be already mak-
ing reforms of this type, so the additional cost
imposed by the WTO may be less than the full cost.
If half these costs are taken to be directly attribut-
able to the WTO and about 60 countries are affected,
the total cost is about $0.4 billion.
To calculate the costs of past agricultural liber-
alization to Net Food Importing Developing Countries
(NFIDC), there a recent World Bank study (Mitchell
and Hoppe, 2006). If there is no further liberaliza-
tion, the cost could be $0–0.3 billion. There are many
estimates of preference erosion available, but if there
is no settlement, only the planned changes in the
banana and sugar regimes need to be included; these
are about $0.6 billion (Gillson et al., 2004). The cot-
ton exporters estimated that the United States and
EU subsidies cost them $250 million in direct costs
and $1 billion in indirect costs (WTO, 2003c). These
and the costs to NFIDCs are annual, so these esti-
mates add up to $2 billion annual costs to the perhaps
$0.5 billion in one-off costs (if we make some al-
lowance for costs of implementation of any changes
in rules in the Doha Round). Assumptions about the
speed and skill of adjustment increase the uncertainty
of estimates. The countries most seriously affected
by implementation costs will be those who are fur-
thest from the new standards and those least likely
to have instituted reforms because of regional com-
mitments.
These estimates do not include the fiscal costs
of liberalizing a country’s own imports because even
if there is a Doha settlement, for LDCs the cost would
definitely be 0 (as they are not expected to reduce
their tariffs) and for most other developing coun-
tries, the cost will probably also be 0 (bound tariffs
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remove some water in the tariffs, not reduce rev-
enue). For those which will need to reduce their
applied rates, the cost to national income is still close
to 0. There is a transfer from the government (re-
duction in import tax revenue) to those purchasing
imports. To restore the previous position, the gov-
ernment would need to incur some administrative
costs in finding alternative revenue, but it is wrong
to count the revenue lost as a national cost.
Estimates of past aid for general trade. The
OECD estimates (OECD, 2006) that in 2004 total
AfT on the broadest definition was $22.7 billion, of
which $2.5 billion was for technical assistance and
capacity building, $12.9 billion for infrastructure (or
about $9 billion if United States aid to Iraq and Af-
ghanistan is excluded as a special case),12 and $7.3 bil-
lion for productive capacities. It estimates that this
was about a quarter of total official development
assistance excluding debt relief. Spending on Uru-
guay Round implementation costs has been around
$0.4 billion per annum, close to the estimates above.
The value of capacity building has fluctuated
around $0.2 billion, representing the category with
the lowest AfT spending. This may be explained by
the nature of training activities. Support for institu-
tions that improve capacity to trade has been about
$1.1 billion a year.
Many donors (bilateral and multilateral) have
announced their intention to increase aid for infra-
structure. Support for building up private sector
enterprise has also increased, from about $0.5 bil-
lion in 2001 to $0.9 billion in 2004.
All major donors have either maintained or in-
creased their spending on trade related assistance
over the period 2001–2004. The United States (be-
cause of spending in Iraq and Afghanistan) was the
country with the highest contribution in AfT in 2004.
(For a recent detailed analysis of the United States
AfT see Langton, 2007.) Australia, Belgium, Den-
mark and France have also increased their spending.
Japan was the largest donor over 2001–2004, mainly
due to its large assistance in infrastructure invest-
ments. The EC is the largest donor in the categories
more strictly related to trade (Trade Policy and Regu-
lation and Trade Development), with a relatively
lower spending on infrastructure (though the level
of aid for infrastructure is still high) (te Velde et al.,
2006).
An examination of aid by recipient (table 1)
shows that the funds are fairly equally spread across
regions, with Asian regions (Far East, South and
Central Asia and Middle East) all receiving over
$3 billion in 2004, the same amount as sub-Saharan
Africa. However the Far East has enjoyed stable in-
flows, while flows into sub-Saharan Africa have
increased only recently. The largest recipient coun-
tries were all Asian: Viet Nam, India, Indonesia and
China. The top sub-Saharan recipient, Ethiopia is in
the 12th position, confirming a different (less trade
related) model of development assistance for sub-
Saharan Africa compared to Asia.
Low-middle income countries (LMIs) and non-
LDCs low income countries (OLICs) have received
the highest share of trade related funds over 2001–
2004 (table 2). LDCs receive the lowest level of
spending in trade-related assistance relative to total
aid among the large aid recipients. There is only one
LDC (Bangladesh) in the first ten recipients of past
AfT. These figures are a cause for concern as LDCs
and African countries are among those most likely
to need support to trade.
4.5 Pledges for Aid for Trade
In the second half of 2005, including at the
Hong Kong Ministerial, and then again in 2006, “in-
creases” in trade-related aid were announced by
several donors. They do not seem represent an ac-
celeration of recent spending on trade aid. The EU
announced at the G8 Conference in 2005, repeated
at the Hong Kong Ministerial and (Bounds, 2006)
in 2006, a total of 2 billion euro, half from the Com-
mission and half from national governments. This is
restricted to trade policy and regulations and insti-
tutional support, not infrastructure. This appears to
mean 1 billion euro a year from 2007 from the Com-
mission and 1 billion euro a year from 2010 for
members. (Within this, the United Kingdom has of-
fered £100 million, about 150 million euro.) Japan
offered at the Hong Kong Ministerial a total of
$10 billion, all to “trade, production, and distribu-
tion infrastructure” (WTO, 2005c), apparently over
three years. The United States offered $2.7 billion
at the Hong Kong Ministerial, apparently for both
trade policy and infrastructure (Wilska and von
Bonsdorff, 2006). For all these it was not stated how
much is additional.25 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
Table 1
AID FOR TRADE BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY/REGION AND YEAR
(USD '000)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001–2004 Ranka
Total Aid for Trade 11,151,490 11,216,131 12,312,349 17,798,386 52,478,356
1. Far East Asia 3,247,649 2,982,697 2,958,317 3,474,778 12,663,441
Viet Nam 716,339 992,886 767,227 1,066,953 3,543,405 1
Indonesia 464,332 123,506 1,143,825 1,242,666 2,974,329 3
China 1,005,238 655,597 606,128 382,171 2,649,134 4
Philippines 668,005 595,666 110,687 116,406 1,490,764 6
Thailand 47,018 393,344 18,791 427,664 886,817 11
2. Sub-Saharan Africa 2,556,546 1,587,703 2,723,313 3,246,941 10,114,503
Ethiopia 179,886 247,894 197,040 234,745 859,565 12
United Rep. of Tanzania 392,666 34,741 47,909 356,105 831,421 13
Mozambique 278,741 98,145 218,876 170,992 766,754 15
Kenya 128,781 5,066 113,660 447,553 695,060 17
Ghana 275,816 56,870 193,050 104,017 629,753 18
Uganda 340,422 62,900 72,657 148,960 624,939 19
3. South and Central Asia 1,330,671 2,123,079 2,406,415 3,108,523 8,968,688
India 319,768 710,666 801,953 1,353,725 3,186,112 2
Bangladesh 151,804 355,547 598,291 324,103 1,429,745 7
Afghanistan 378 40,424 271,584 771,716 1,084,102 -
Sri Lanka 288,434 429,116 220,819 107,642 1,046,011 9
4. Europe 1,647,466 2,307,528 1,340,546 1,975,460 7,271,000
Russian Federation 276,060 522,627 396,987 630,673 1,826,347 5
Serbia and Montenegro 88,038 148,814 200,497 360,486 797,835 14
Romania 339,378 128,648 20,257 211,770 700,053 16
5. Middle East 152,742 96,491 173,027 3,396,974 3,819,234
Iraq 4 5 60,828 3,257,910 3,318,747 -
6. North Africa 497,575 834,683 803,957 710,042 2,846,257
Egypt 93,221 204,883 456,164 292,520 1,046,788 8
Morocco 174,648 171,970 276,884 268,777 892,279 10
7. Central America 576,907 281,135 393,600 558,451 1,810,093
Nicaragua 123,104 38,130 36,038 146,744 344,016 29
8. South America 233,253 295,186 290,723 227,447 1,046,609
Bolivia 11,688 103,367 106,259 46,269 267,583 38
9. Oceania 154,170 60,476 113,454 290,460 618,560
Papua New Guinea 59,190 8,626 34,747 159,261 261,824 39
Source: OECD/WTO database.
a Countries are ranked according to the cumulative 2001–2004 spending.26 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
The total G8 commitment, confirmed at the
2006 meeting, is still stated as $4 billion annually
for AfT (G8, 2006), in total, not the increase, and
including the Enhanced Integrated Framework. Even
taking the most limited OECD definition, $2.5 bil-
lion for trade related technical assistance, this would
be an increase of only 60 per cent, and compared to
the higher estimates of around $23 billion (OECD,
2006) it implies an increase of less than 10 per cent.
If it includes the Japanese pledge, it includes some
infrastructure, so it may be no increase. This would
mean a fall in the share of AfT in total aid, given the
promises made in July 2005 by the G8, confirmed
by the Finance Ministers, December 2005 (AITIC,
2006) to double aid to Africa. It is substantially less
than assumed in the WTO’s Concept Paper (WTO,
2006a) for the Task Force which expected a dou-
bling of AfT, an extra $2 billion by 2007, rising to
“an additional $5–6 billion by 2010”, about 10 per
cent of the additional aid promised of $50 billion,
so a total of $10–12 billion. (These seem to use an
estimate of $5 billion for current spending.) Even
the most conservative (OECD) estimates for what
was needed were a 67 per cent increase, to preserve
its share of total projected aid, with $4.3 billion for
trade related technical assistance alone, and $33.7 bil-
lion including infrastructure (OECD, 2006: 41–42).
These apparent inconsistencies of definition and
of the pledges should have been clarified by the WTO
Director General under his Hong Kong mandate to
consult on additional finance, but there has still been
no report on these consultations except for his com-
ment (WTO, 2006g) that “all of the key donors have
confirmed to me that they remain committed to fol-
lowing through with their Hong Kong pledges.”
The original demand by developing countries,
notably the LDCs, was that AfT be additional to
planned increases in total aid, in order not to divert
resources from other areas. All statements by do-
nors have refused to accept this, arguing that the large
increase projected for total aid ($50 billion more per
year by 2010) was designed to allow for any new
demands, and therefore for AfT. The targeting of
these amounts, however, dates to the Monterrey con-
Table 2
DESTINATION OF AID FOR TRADE BY INCOME GROUP,
SHARES IN TOTAL AND SPECIALIZATION INDEX
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001–2004
LDCs (share, per cent) 2 21 62 62 12 1
LDCs (index) 1.07 0.70 1.04 0.83 0.88
Other Low Income Countries (share, per cent) 2 52 42 92 82 7
Other Low Income Countries (index) 0.84 1.00 0.97 1.30 1.04
Low-Middle Income Countries (share, per cent) 2 83 52 33 53 1
Low-Middle Income Countries (index) 1.09 1.34 0.92 1.15 1.14
Upper-Middle Income Countries (share, per cent)33312
Upper-Middle Income Countries (index) 1.00 0.84 0.69 0.39 0.59
Others and unallocated (share, per cent) 2 12 21 91 51 9
Others and unallocated (index) 1.00 0.94 1.23 0.74 0.97
Total Aid for Trade (US$ million) 11,151 11,216 12,312 17,798 42,507
Source: OECD/WTO database.
Note: The index is obtained by dividing the share of an income group in total aid for trade over the share of the income group
in total ODA; an index greater than 1 means that a country is receiving aid for trade more than proportionally with respect
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ference of 2002, before the recognition of the costs
of WTO implementation and the Doha negotiations,
and they were accepted by the G8 in July 2005, before
any formal discussion of AfT, so this is disingenuous.
If some of the financing required is for international
public goods, whether to support the international
trading system or more particularly to achieve suc-
cess in the Doha negotiations, the fact that “most
DAC members have already made commitments for
their total aid levels to at least the year 2010” (OECD,
2006: 41) is not a convincing reason to reject the
possibility of increased spending on non-aid pur-
poses.13 But even accepting the overall limit, it is
difficult to argue that commitments for AfT are “ad-
ditional”, as demanded by the Task Force, if the value
is either stagnating increasing more slowly than in
the past and they are a falling share of total aid.
4.6 Allocating Aid for Trade: criteria,
constraints, and eligibility
In the early discussions of AfT, it was impor-
tant to find needs that could be justified as related to
WTO obligations or negotiations because the inten-
tion was to use the negotiations to obtain the money.
This remained true up to and including the phrasing
in the Hong Kong Declaration. Now the position is
different. The principle of spending more on trade
has been secured, but the negotiations have failed.
It is now important to ensure that spending can be
justified even in the absence of a Round. This is re-
flected in the rephrasing of the objectives in the Task
Force Report. One risk (from a multilateral point of
view) is that spending to promote other types of
trade, notably regional or bilateral arrangements,
which may damage prospects for multilateral agree-
ments, will be accounted for as AfT. The EU, for
example, has announced that it will spend what it
has pledged on AfT on support for the ACP in their
negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements
(Bounds, 2006).
Some projects might be related to regulations
or adjustment or new opportunities that are the re-
sult of a regional or bilateral agreement. If these are
only slightly related (improving infrastructure for
regional trade), it would be impossible to exclude
them, and probably wrong to do so. But if they were
specifically the result of that agreement (for exam-
ple assistance in negotiating or setting up a regional
organization or enforcing a regional set of standards),
it would probably be wrong to include them in the
WTO monitoring of spending.
One way suggested to extend the categories
covered from those directly part of trading, while
keeping a trade-related focus, is a “value-chain”
approach. This was suggested by the LDCs (Patel,
2005; WTO, 2006d) and was developed in a paper
by Wilska and von Bonsdorff (2006). They argue
that “There can be many relevant AfT needs that are
crucial for enhancing export competitiveness of an
economic sector, but may not have immediate con-
nection to cross-border trade.” (Wilska and von
Bonsdorff, 2006: 11) They give examples both of
necessary productive inputs (including infrastruc-
ture) and required institutional or governmental
inputs (including investment and competition policy,
as well as trade policy).
The question of which countries should be eli-
gible for any special treatment is sensitive in both
aid and trade. The only classification in current use
that is the same is Least Developed Countries. This
is the determinant of eligibility for the Integrated
Framework and is used to offer more special treat-
ment in the WTO both in WTO rules (compliance
with TRIPS, lack of obligations to make offers on
goods in the Doha Round, etc.) and in WTO-per-
mitted derogations such as preferences. That these
countries should be included in AfT is already de-
termined in the Hong Kong statement. Beyond this,
while aid agencies can determine their own differ-
entiations among recipients and define groups, the
WTO can only differentiate by consensus of all mem-
bers. The WTO gives special status in a few agree-
ments to “developing countries”; it specifies this as
a condition for allowing preferences. Although this
is conventionally described as “self-selecting”, in
practice the list is not open to all: countries can be
strongly encouraged to graduate themselves (for
example, countries which have joined the EU), and
countries joining the WTO have had to negotiate
details of their rules, even if they have been allowed
to call themselves developing.
An alternative approach has been to list coun-
tries other than LDCs that may be eligible for
particular treatment (e.g. the NFIDCs in the agree-
ment on agricultural subsidies in the Uruguay Round)
or excluded from it (e.g. the agreement on import-
ing pharmaceutical products of 2003). In legal terms,
any modification of the group “developing countries”
for AfT in the WTO would have to follow this model.28 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
The controversy over membership of the Task Force
suggests that countries will not exclude themselves.
As some AfT is likely to be for international institu-
tions, for example the Advisory Centre on World
Trade Law, or to meet regional needs, excluding
some developing countries could restrict its useful-
ness. In the absence of a Doha settlement, there
would be no legal way to change the coverage from
“developing countries”.
4.7 High aid makes trading harder
(Dutch Disease)
Aid inflows are a positive flow in a country’s
balance of payments. They therefore have potentially
the same effect as exports of increasing the supply
of foreign currency to the country. Like any increase
in supply, this results in a fall in price. Therefore
there is an upward revaluation of the value of the
domestic currency. For exporters (or those compet-
ing with imports), the change in the exchange rate
reduces the return that they can expect, measured in
their own currency.14
In the case of a permanent change in trade (for
example if a country discovers a sufficiently large
source of oil so that it can expect high income into
the indefinite future), this negative effect on other
producers is exactly what is needed, as the economy
has to restructure itself (at least in relative terms)
away from what it was previously producing and
trading. In the case of a permanent flow of funds,
for example from a relatively prosperous part of a
country to a poorer, the same argument might hold.
The situation where the export or the inflow of
capital is expected to be temporary is different.15
There are adjustment costs, both to shifting away
from the existing pattern of production and, once
the flow stops, towards a different pattern. There-
fore the correct development strategy is more un-
certain, because policy makers will want to maximize
the temporary benefit without incurring unnecessary
costs of adjustment. Aid to assist trade must take
account of both the immediate negative effects which
the aid itself will have (through the exchange rate)
and the medium term ones on incentives to move
into export production if the aid inflows are expected
to remain high into the medium term.
It is important not to exaggerate the problem.
If the “temporary” is more medium term than short
term, and if the economy would in any case have
found it necessary to move out if its existing pro-
duction pattern in order to develop, the “Disease”
may not impose significant additional adjustment costs.
The benefits will always be greater than any costs,
unless all revenue is wasted.16 This may be particu-
larly true of a very poor country where the temporary
increase from aid may reduce serious poverty.
There are also potentially damaging govern-
ance effects from large inflows of aid which are rel-
evant to AfT. Large aid inflows potentially affect
the political development of the country, and create
a clear inconsistency with the aid principle of coun-
try ownership. If the single most important, or even
the majority, source of both finance and policy is
external, the question of the accountability of the
government must be raised. In some African coun-
tries, it has been over a half of government expendi-
ture. Even if donors use the language of partnership,
they have their own priorities and cannot avoid ad-
vocating them. A strong government may be able to
override donor wishes and take its priorities from
its electorate and legislature, but many developing
countries have weak political systems. If aid donors
try to deal with this by finding alternative ways of
consulting public opinion, for example direct con-
tacts with interest groups, this may further weaken
the system and attenuate the accountability of the
government.
Even if the government and the donor do ne-
gotiate on trade as if there were no aid relationship,
the perception in the developing country will be af-
fected by the aid relationship. A government is
expected to take account of national interests in form-
ing its trade position. In a non-aid dependent country,
this means listening to the major economic inter-
ests, traders and those competing with traded goods
and (although often neglected) consumers. One way
that these interests make their importance felt is as
taxpayers. In an aid-dependent country, the most
regularly consulted “interest group” is probably the
donors. They are also a, perhaps the, major source
of government revenue. Normal economic actors
may feel that their interests are unlikely to be taken
into account. This pessimism may reduce their ex-
pected returns from trading and investing, damaging
development. If a developing country official knows
that his country is heavily dependent on the trading
partner for aid, he is unlikely to forget this when press-
ing for a trade concession or when trying to ensure
that a trading partner keeps its trade agreements.29 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
If there is an even more direct relationship,
because of AfT, in particular direct support for ne-
gotiating capacity or in trade disputes, this intensifies
the problem. Learning to use trade negotiations and
institutions effectively is important for countries try-
ing to improve their trade performance, and donors
have helped to build capacity and have directly
funded some of the costs of participation (aid for
salaries, travel to meetings, costs of representation).
But if a negotiator has his salary paid by a trading
partner country, and has travelled to a negotiation
with that country on a ticket paid for by that coun-
try, it may be difficult for him to disregard this when
in the negotiation.
There is evidence that the aid relationship can
be a problem in trade negotiations where there is a
direct role for aid. The EU has had a combined aid
and trade relationship (Lomé agreements) with its
associated ex-colonies, the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries. The ACP have been much
less effective in negotiations with the EU than in the
WTO. As the same people were involved in both
sets of negotiations, lack of capacity or inexperience
cannot be the answer. The main reason for the dif-
ference appears to be that the role of the EU as donor
is constantly emphasised as part of the same nego-
tiation (Page, 2004).
Like “Dutch Disease”, aid dependency syn-
drome need not make trading impossible, and it is
unlikely to make either the trading or the negotiat-
ing performance of the country actually worse than
they would be in the absence of aid. But it can re-
duce the benefits. The implementation of AfT should
be designed to avoid or minimise the risks from po-
litical dependency.
5. Suggestions for the architecture
of Aid for Trade
The different purposes and the large scale of
what donors are now calling AfT, as well as the un-
willingness of both donors and recipients to rely on
a single existing institution, suggest that the way in
which AfT will work will be mainly through exist-
ing funds, multilateral and bilateral. In some cases
the changes in scale may require new administra-
tion and new types of spending. It is possible that
some of the needs identified here will be so far from
what donors and their rules of operation recognize
as official development assistance that new funds or
new sections of funds will be needed.
The need for AfT has been formally accepted
by the WTO through consensus of its members. Oth-
ers involved in aid, in particular the World Bank
and the IMF which are intended to act in coherence
with the WTO, must therefore accept that trade now
has a special claim on aid, equal to other interna-
tional commitments, such as the Paris Principles.
In 2005, countries acting as members of the
World Bank and the IMF rejected the call for a new
approach to AfT while, at the same time, as mem-
bers of the WTO, they accepted it in the Hong Kong
Declaration. Countries acting in the international
financial institutions will need to support the inter-
ests that they have identified as members of the WTO.
One obvious difference between trade and most
other aid subjects is that it always crosses borders.
Some aid projects (for example, in energy, water,
etc.) have had to deal with regional problems, but
the normal model is country-based. The potential
share of regional or international spending in trade-
related spending will be higher than in existing aid.
There may be a need to increase the share in new
aid of those institutions which are already better able
to deal with regions (e.g. regional development
banks, a few donors) and to encourage reorganiza-
tion of aid administration in the others.
For some donors, using or allocating funds on
the basis of trade-related needs, rather than poverty
or other criteria, may be not only unfamiliar, but
contrary to the legal requirements of their aid pro-
grammes. For these, it may be necessary to establish
new funds (as in the EU sugar Action Plan and the
IMF TIM).
The organization of AfT funding could be ei-
ther on the basis of ex ante assessments of countries’
needs or by setting up definitions of the potential
scope of coverage, and allowing countries (or re-
gions) to apply for funds. Programmes such as the
IF provide assessment of trade needs, separately from
programmes to fund the needs. The evidence is that
this does not work. The country has no guarantee
that they will be funded, and therefore the initial
assessment is not taken seriously, and perhaps merely
repeats “what everyone knows”; the result is that
assessments become even less likely to be used. If
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must be re-assessed by the funding agency. The In-
tegrated framework experience demonstrates that
there is a need for a mechanism to ensure that all
projects put forward are considered by some agency,
and assigned priorities by it.
If the implementation of AfT is through exist-
ing programmes, then the rules of each donor and
programme will constrain what is offered to whom.
As there is a strong argument for accepting that ex-
isting systems will work best if they work in their
normal mode, and with their normal recipients, this
may be effective for those needs and those countries
which are covered. But this suggests that the Task
Force’s suggestion of a Clearing House Function to
identify gaps, and find ways of filling them, will be
very important.
Past experience of country-based initiatives
suggests that if AfT is left to these, there will be
inadequate spending on trade. The Aid for Trade Task
Force asked all the international organizations which
it contacted if “trade has been adequately addressed
in countries’ development plans and poverty reduc-
tion strategies”. All (World Bank, IMF, ITC, UNIDO,
UNCTAD, UNDP) agreed that it had not, whether
because of lack of interest or lack of capacity (WTO,
2006d).
The models for the project approach are largely
from outside trade, but are found in other funds which
have emerged out of international conventions, rather
than specifically from aid programmes, e.g. the Glo-
bal Environment Fund (GEF); and in terms of
country aid, in the offering of support to country
budgets under HIPC debt relief or the Sector Wide
approaches. These provide support for a specified
type of spending in a country, so they are between
project and unspecified aid.
There might be some rigidity and potential dis-
tortion with vertical funds, but where an issue has
been neglected by donors imposing rigidity and re-
versing past distortions may be required. In the case
of the Montreal Protocol, quick agreement was found
to fund a specific problem, the elimination of cer-
tain greenhouse gases according to certain
timetables. Some issues require global coordination
and involvement of a pool of expertise. UNCTAD
relies on expertise in the area of trade negotiations,
the Global Fund to fight Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), Tuberculosis and Malaria relies
on health expertise, Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunisation (GAVI) for vaccines brings funders
and private sector expertise together.
It may be that a compromise between special
funds and general assistance is to ensure that the
special funds have broad aims (e.g. HIPC) and align
their rules with the government and with other pro-
grammes. One example of such a compromise is the
Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), a process where
donors give significant funding to a government’s
comprehensive sector policy and expenditure pro-
gramme. It might focus aid on the trade sector,
broadly defined, without tying it to a narrow range
of projects. It is hard to assess the possibility of
adopting a SWAp to AfT. The major obstacle to that
is inherent into the definition of AfT. A broad defi-
nition of needs may be too broad to fit within one
ministry-based SWAp.
Guaranteeing the funds, i.e., ensuring that the
commitments are not only made, but credible, will
need to be done through the mechanisms that each
agency or fund uses to set its programme, as in the
absence of negotiations, there is no way to build this
into the WTO. There are legal means within each
donor to make long term spending commitments and
to alter any restrictions on aid agencies’ competences
that discourage them from spending on productive
activities. The WTO in its monitoring function will
need to ensure that such commitments are made. Its
role is to help to identify what these mechanisms are,
and then to report, on whether the legal pledges,
etc., have been made and whether they continue to
be made to replenish funds. This might fall under
the Director General’s responsibilities under the
Hong Kong mandate.
Countries which are donors or acting as mem-
bers of the international financial institutions must
ensure that they commit their funds in a credible
way.
The proposed system of WTO monitoring will
cover what is being spent, and in what countries, on
what projects; and, at the country level, whether
countries are getting appropriate levels of funding.
To have an effective system of evaluation, the WTO
should identify some set of criteria on which projects
could be judged, such as the return in trade-related
terms to the investment, the lack of other ways of
funding it, or the poverty of the country. It also needs
to use the proposed base-line estimates to check
whether there is additionality.31 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
The monitoring process will use the reports on
overall aid, by categories, and on the performance
of individual donors by the OECD-DAC. This will
need to be extended to give details of regional pro-
grammes and trade-related infrastructure. The Com-
mittee on Trade and Development may need to ask
the Secretariat to include in its annual report on trade
a chapter on the level, direction, and types of trade-
related aid. This would allow the Committee on
Trade and Development (CTD) and the General
Council to discuss whether the aid was sufficient
and appropriate.
At the level of countries, both giving and re-
ceiving funds, the review mechanism is the Trade
Policy Review. This could draw on country reports
by the OECD, for donors, and by the IMF and World
Bank, for recipients. The current low frequency of
TPRs for developing countries might need to be
changed or supplemented by interim reports. It is
never the function of the TPR to determine compli-
ance with WTO commitments (whether by the
country being reviewed or by any donors which may
have made commitments to it), but it is its function
to provide the information on which such judgements
can be made. A country being reviewed could use its
response to the Secretariat report to draw attention
to any gaps in funding relative to what it had identi-
fied as necessary.
An implicit problem in the Task Force’s delib-
erations and in all discussions of AfT is the conflict
between the apparent virtues of a coordinated ap-
proach and the fear that this will mean in practice
domination by the principal donors and especially
by the World Bank. The history of the Integrated
Framework is, from this point of view, a warning
not a precedent. In principle, comprehensive assess-
ment and co-ordination must be considered “good
things”, and coordination with other agencies is one
of the functions proposed for the “monitoring”
mechanism. A risk, however, is that this system is
basically an aid approach, where the agencies con-
front the country. The advantage of the WTO over
the international financial organizations has been that
its structure and the requirement that all countries
join a “consensus” for most agreements give devel-
oping countries a direct voice in decisions.
The World Bank has an approach to trade lib-
eralization which goes against the basis of the WTO:
the economist’s approach of seeing the economic
welfare advantages of unilateral liberalization rather
than the negotiator’s approach of preferring agreed
simultaneous liberalization. The negotiating ap-
proach is what has given developing countries a
voice in the introduction and design of Aid for Trade.
The criticisms by some observers (e.g. Thomas,
2006) that the Task Force members took insufficient
account of existing mechanisms and did not specify
a institutional role for the “core” agencies, such as
they have in the Integrated Framework, but only
asked for greater coordination misunderstands their
difficulties. They may or may not have been right to
reject them, but they were aware of them. The ini-
tial report by Ambassadors Horn af Rantzien and
Rugwabiza (World Bank and IMF, 2005b) had had
a much clearer recommendation: that they be by-
passed.
They suggested that there should be a new fund
and “Resources from the fund would be allocated
on a project basis, or as budget support for trade-
related programs with an overall maximum country
allocation set in accordance with criteria to be agreed.
... It would be for the country to decide an appropri-
ate institutional partner with expertise. ... While the
intention would be to use the existing IF partner
agencies, it may be desirable to extend this to
include other multilateral agencies (notably the
regional banks, Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO), UNIDO) and also pri-
vate sector partners.”
The WTO “Follow-up on the Aid-for-Trade
Task Force Recommendations” (WTO, 2006f) pro-
vides for an Ad Hoc Consultative Group of donors
and the private sector “to assist in preparing global
reviews of Aid for Trade, as well as in providing
follow up support in terms of advocacy and fund
raising at country and regional level”. This is not
the same as the Task Force recommendations. The
Task Force recommended an Ad Hoc group as an
immediate measure to “take forward” its recommen-
dations, but also suggested that the WTO or donors
find a way of matching and brokering unfunded
Trade-related assistance (TRA) needs and available
donor funding for such projects and programmes.
[and] Assign responsibility for these functions. The
fact that proposals on this were weakened in the
course of the Task Force’s deliberations and after
suggests that any pressure on donors to fund accord-
ing to trade definitions of need will face resistance.
The Task Force followed the aid model of not im-
posing obligations on donors to fund identified needs
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ments. A strong role for the WTO in identifying needs
in advance as well as monitoring performance ex
post could help to counter donors’ reluctance to of-
fer predictability.
If increased AfT will lead to increased aid for
directly productive activities or to infrastructure
where the needs are defined by those who are en-
gaged in production, then the interests of private
sectors are likely to be much more directly involved
than in most other aid sectors. Except for the inclu-
sion of private sector representatives in the Ad Hoc
group, there is no indication of how aid agencies or
recipient governments will take account of private
sector interests. Allocating more aid through the
agencies with experience in working with the pri-
vate sector could be a solution.
The introduction of Aid for Trade may not mean
an end to all preferential trade. A return to a situa-
tion where preferences were simple and relatively
rare would remove many of the threats to the sys-
tem and to the interests of non-preferred countries.
In a 2030 world of fewer, weaker, developing coun-
tries, it would be more difficult for them to demand
extensive preferences as a price for their participa-
tion in the system. It will be essential that the WTO
and its members avoid neglecting even a weakened
developing country group.
6. The future for Aid for Trade
The hopes that the Aid for Trade initiative would
mark new approaches to aid and to building the in-
ternational trade regime may now be in part disap-
pointed because the failure of the Doha negotiations
means that it will have to stand alone. It remains a
success for developing country participation in the
WTO that an initiative where they both identified
the problem (that trade liberalization can have nega-
tive effects) and the solution (targeted aid) has led
to new attention to the linkages between aid and
trade.17 This success has reinforced those in the aid
community who believe that it is time to devote more
aid to production and trade. The WTO has acquired
a responsibility to monitor flows of aid for trade
purposes, and acceptance of the Task Force’s rec-
ommendations on monitoring by the Committee on
Trade and Development, an annual discussion in the
General Council, and detailed monitoring of donors
and recipients in the Trade Policy Reviews gives it
the opportunity to criticise and propose reforms. But
the reluctance of the WTO as an organization to chal-
lenge the traditional aid agencies, the agencies’ re-
fusal to subject their decisions on the allocation or
form of lending to external criteria, and the lack of
negotiations in which developing countries could
demand changes to aid in return for trade conces-
sions mean that although there will be increased
flows of funds for trade-related purposes, there will
be no way to ensure that these purposes will be de-
termined by the priorities of the international trad-
ing system and no certainty that they will be allocated
by national trading priorities.18
The developing countries that argued for any
financial scheme to be completely de-linked from
any obligation to accept liberalization have suc-
ceeded, while those who wanted it only alongside
liberalization on agriculture have lost out. Neverthe-
less, so far, they have not challenged the introduction
of AfT without a trade agreement.
Before and during the deliberations of the Task
Force there were serious concerns by developing
countries about the principle of compensation. Devel-
oping countries with preferences remained divided
on whether compensation was a satisfactory substi-
tute. Many preferred trade mechanisms, and clearly
continuing existing preferences, perhaps supple-
mented by new ones, requires less adjustment within
countries. For those who believe that it would be
possible to maintain some of the special arrange-
ments, this may seem the better option. Those who
do not believe that this is possible see compensation
as an acceptable second best, but would be concerned
if it was allocated according to the normal criteria
and with the normal costs of IMF/World Bank arrange-
ments. If offering compensation is to be successful in
solving the problem of encouraging liberalization
without damaging some poor countries, the details
of its design will be important.
Among developing countries which have not
been major preference receivers, there was concern
that AfT would be considered a sufficient gesture in
the direction of a “development round”. For coun-
tries which are not likely to receive substantial shares
of any AfT because they are neither losers nor poor,
the suggestion made by some European negotiators
that AfT plus assistance to the LDCs constitutes a
“development package” is unacceptable. The current
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October 2005 and then later in July 2006 (Mandelson,
2006) after the collapse of the Doha negotiations that:
First we should push ahead with the Aid
for Trade package because developing coun-
tries’ capacity constraints remain unchanged.
Second, we should continue to put together a
new agreement on trade facilitation, which is
linked to aid for trade and will be a focus of
our trade related assistance in the years ahead.
Third, we should put in place the new Inte-
grated Framework for technical assistance to
trade for the LDCs and get it up and running.
Fourth, the Hong Kong agreement on duty
free quota free market access should be fully
implemented outside of the Round and possi-
bly improved. Fifth, we should also pursue
specific proposals on Special and Differential
Treatment on a fast track and stand alone ba-
sis, adapting existing WTO agreements in this
way. Sixth, we should continue to work on
making origin rules more development friendly.
Seventh, we should see if we can put in place
improvements on the dispute settlement un-
derstanding to make it easier for developing
countries to use. This in summary is a seven
point action plan for salvaging or extending
the development agenda.
This proposal failed even as compensation, as
it offered AfT targeted at the poor and small devel-
oping countries, but nothing to the major ones whose
power in the WTO had increased. This does not sup-
port the argument by some opponents of AfT that it
is being offered instead of trade liberalization. The
offer was to one set of countries to gain their negotiat-
ing support against the countries seeking concessions.
The WTO has not yet fully implemented the
provisions of the Hong Kong Declaration or the rec-
ommendations of the Aid for Trade Task Force. In
his report to the December General Council, the
Director General of the WTO asserted that the “most
important” question for monitoring was “a more fo-
cused, country-specific perspective on whether trade
needs are being met” and stated that “Aid for Trade
is clearly important to a large number of our Mem-
bers” (WTO, 2006g). This is a retreat from argu-
ments that aid provides international public goods
or that it is important to all members because it helps
to provide the preconditions for a successful nego-
tiation. There are now procedures to monitor Aid
for Trade, but there are no criteria for that monitor-
ing either of quantity or of effectiveness, as the
report of the Director General does not mention
additionality and does not define what “trade needs”
are to be covered. There has, therefore, been a fail-
ure to provide any secure mechanisms on “how to
operationalize Aid for Trade” (WTO, 2005a).
It is a success that AfT stayed on the agenda
after the collapse of the Round, but there is now no
institutional momentum behind it because the WTO
has effectively turned it over to the traditional do-
nors, retaining only a monitoring role, while the
traditional donors, with a few exceptions in special-
ised areas, do not want to change their behaviour.
And for the first group to present a clear demand for
AfT, the West African cotton producers, there have
been reviews of the financial assistance available to
them, but no special fund or guarantee of funding.
On the figures announced so far, there appears
to be little or no increase in total AfT and its share of
total aid may fall, so there is no additionality. Some
critics of AfT would say that if this is what countries
want, it fits the Paris Principles for aid, but there is
an international development interest in shifting more
aid towards improving the trading and productive
capacities of developing countries. And it would be
wrong to lose sight of the international trading in-
terest. It seems odd to build an international system
of aid based entirely on the needs defined by indi-
vidual countries with no way of taking account of
interests that cross borders. Some are in specific
changes, physical and institutional infrastructure.
Some are systemic effects on the trading system. But
there is also an interest in avoiding an aid system
that creates bilateral political dependency. This is
bad in itself, and it makes impossible the effective
operation of an international trading organization and
regime based on the assumption that countries rep-
resent only their own interests.
One reason that AfT emerged as an issue, and
the main reason why it remained on the agenda in
the absence of a Doha settlement is that trade policy
makers, in both developed and developing countries,
believe that trade is not given sufficient importance
in aid programmes, and that this is at least partly
because of lack of interest by donors, not only be-
cause of mistakes by recipients. Therefore the force
behind AfT was about imposing outside constraints
on donors. It also imposes constraint on recipients,
but all aid programmes do this. The concept of “own-
ership” in the aid rhetoric is deeply flawed. Beggars
can’t be choosers. All aid is ultimately a matter of
negotiation between the aims of the donors and those
of the recipients, with the advantage on the donor side.34 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 45
The Task Force justifies the role of the WTO
in AfT in terms of the “coherence mandate”. It will
be important that the international Financial agen-
cies, in particular the World Bank, also take coherence
seriously, and recognize that trade can have legiti-
mate priorities. The IMF has done this with its Trade
Integration Mechanism, but the World Bank has not
yet altered its position that it has no responsibility
for WTO-related needs. In 2005, countries were more
able to impose a developing country agenda on AfT
at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, than
at the World Bank and the IMF, at the September
meetings. But now, as control of AfT has effectively
shifted back to the financial institutions, countries
will need to use their membership in these if they
want to change the approach to aid.
Notes
1 Some analysts assume that the benefits of preferences
are captured by importers, not by developing country
exporters, but as some of the most important preferences
(e.g. sugar) are based on country quotas, which are likely
to ensure that countries not importers gain, this is not
major limitation. Some results differ because they cal-
culate the net effect (if negative) from all parts of any
WTO settlement. i.e. offsetting the preferences lost by
any gains on other goods or services, rather than the to-
tal losses from preferences.
2 Because the largest losses are for exporters of primary
products, changes in rules of origin will not resolve all
the losses.
3 The European Commission (EC), at Cancún and after,
has repeatedly suggested that the G20 offer access to
the Least Developed countries as compensation for their
loss of preferences. This could be regarded as a way of
transferring some of the G20 gains to those who lose.
But it would not be an economically equitable solution:
the developed country importers would also have gains
(they would be importing from more efficient produc-
ers, i.e. trade would be “undiverted” from those previ-
ously receiving preferences), and it would not be a prac-
tical one: the reason the preference holders are expected
to lose is that they are not competitive with the non-pre-
ferred developing countries in export markets. It is there-
fore unlikely that they will be competitive in the non-
preferred countries’ own markets.
4 It appeared not to understand that sugar quota holders
like Mauritius receive prices higher than world prices,
not lower (World Bank, 2003: 216–217).
5 It transformed a routine meeting in Geneva in the days
following the announcement of the Task Force in Febru-
ary 2006 into a presentation on Aid for Trade and on its
role and skills in trade-related aid. The Geneva repre-
sentative of the Bank argued that Aid for Trade should
be administered by an agency with country offices.
6 Other organizations also wrote on Aid for Trade (e.g.
Stiglitz and Charlton, 2006), but were not early develop-
ers of the concepts or influential on the outcome so far.
7 The announcement by the WTO (WTO, 2006b) said:
“The Task Force will be composed of these 13 members
in alphabetical order : Barbados, Brazil, Canada, China,
Colombia, the European Union, India, Japan, Thailand,
the United States and the coordinators of the ACP, the
African Group and the LDC Group. The Permanent Rep-
resentative of Sweden, Ambassador Mia Horn af
Rantzien, will chair this Task Force ad personam.” Bar-
bados was also in practice a group representative of the
Small and Vulnerable Economies.
8 The costs and possible ways of funding these are dis-
cussed in more detail in Calì et al., 2006.
9 They are supporting grants in the context of encourag-
ing countries to take regional initiatives, but the same
argument could be used at national level.
10 Questioning whether donors should fund WTO costs, for
example, suggests a limited view of what a country’s
programme should include, as accepting an external ob-
ligation in implicit or explicit return for other benefits
from the international trading system could be consid-
ered a proper decision for a country to make, not one to
be questioned by a donor. This illustrates that donors
support “country ownership” of development pro-
grammes only insofar as countries’ choices match those
of the donors.
11 National public goods and international public goods
may be closely related: the international good of a well-
functioning trading system, for example, may depend
on national public goods in the forms of good adminis-
tration or infrastructure. The cross-national costs and
benefits are likely to be particularly large at the regional
level, even if there is no firm dividing line between re-
gional and international public goods.
12 Infrastructure includes activities in the communication,
transport and energy sectors, without separating out non-
trade related activities. The accuracy of this analysis is
limited by the usual problem of classifying projects that
have broad scope and aims as trade related activities.
13 It is not a convincing reason even to reject increases in
aid as governments can and do alter their budgets.
14 This result holds even if the government immediately
spends the full amount of the aid on imports. The ob-
servable effect on the exchange rate may not appear, but
imports will be in higher supply in the economy, and
therefore the real return to exports still falls.
15 The traditional example is the natural gas resources dis-
covered in the Netherlands, hence Dutch Disease.
16 Some analysis of Dutch Disease shares the views of those
who support the hair-shirt view of trade: that only hard-
ship leads to efficiency, so the role of trade is to alter the
behaviour of comfortable, protected producers.
17 The view by some critics of AfT that it should not be a
bargaining point, in contrast, takes the view that develop-
ing countries should not use their strength to obtain what
they want, but rather depend on convincing developed
countries that they have a moral obligation to give aid.
18 Some new proposals have emerged for how to relate AfT
to the negotiations, in particular that by Lawrence and
Rosito (2006) to delay (rather than avoid) reducing tar-
iffs on the products where preference erosion is most
likely to arise, and use the tariff revenue received dur-35 The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
ing this period to support those who will lose prefer-
ences. The idea is a clever way of ensuring that the costs
of compensation for preference erosion are paid partly
by those who have given the preferences in the past and
partly (by delaying their benefits) by the un-preferred.
But payments of compensation would appear as first in-
come from tariffs and then aid transfers in countries’ budg-
ets, so it is not clear that their cost would be as politically
invisible as preferences were, and it assumes that both
developed countries and the non-preferred developing
countries value a Doha settlement highly enough to be
willing to offer deferred liberalization to obtain it. Given
the current lack of progress in the Doha Round, AfT may
have a better chance of success if is completely de-linked
from the Round, rather than brought back into it.
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